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Osbeck:

Lawyer as Soothsayer: Exploring the Important Role of Outcome
Prediction in the Practice of Law

Outcome prediction has always been an important part of practicing law. Clients rely heavily on
their attorneys to provide accurate assessments of the potential legal consequences they face
when making important decisions (such as whether to accept a plea bargain, or risk a conviction
on a much more serious offense at trial). And yet, notwithstanding its enormous importance to
the practice of law (and notwithstanding the handsome legal fees it commands), outcome
prediction in the law remains a very imprecise endeavor.
The reason for this inaccuracy is that the three principal tools lawyers have traditionally relied
on to facilitate outcome predictions--legal analysis, lawyerly experience, and the use of certain
types of empirical information (e.g., jury verdict reporters)--are all subject to significant
problems and limitations. This article examines in detail the reasons for these problems and
limitations, concluding that they are essentially intractable. Thus, there is little hope that the
traditional tools of outcome prediction on their own can ever enable consistently accurate
assessments of potential legal outcomes.
Fortunately, however, recent advances in data science offer some grounds for optimism.
Already, these advances are beginning to alter the way law firms operate, and there are good
reasons to believe that data science (or more specifically, predictive analytics) will soon enable
more accurate outcome predictions as well. Of course, predictive analytics is not a panacea:
significant challenges remain if it is going to enable accurate outcome predictions on its own.
And so it is doubtful that predictive analytics will supplant the traditional tools of outcome
prediction in the foreseeable future. Rather, predictive analytics is likely to complement the
traditional tools in order to power more accurate outcome predictions. But even that modest
change is likely to have a significant effect on the way lawyers practice law, and it should also
come as very welcome news to their clients.

* I wish to thank the following colleagues for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper:
Debra Austin, Ted Becker, Howard Bromberg, Michael Gilliland, Derek Kiernan-Johnson, David Moran, Nantiya
Ruan, Gabrielle Marks Stafford, Todd Stafford, and David Thomson.
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INTRODUCTION
The practice of law requires lawyers to assume various roles.1 The most celebrated of these
roles is lawyer as advocate: where is, the lawyer stands in the client’s stead, promoting the
client’s interests.2 Less celebrated, but equally important, is the role of the lawyer as advisor.3 In
this role, “a lawyer serving as adviser primarily assists his client in determining the course of
future conduct and relationships.”4 One of the most important tasks lawyers undertake in
furtherance of this advisory role is outcome prediction: that is, advising the client as to the likely
outcome of various legal proceedings.5 In undertaking this vital task, the lawyer is required to

See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble (“In fulfilling his professional
responsibilities, a lawyer necessarily assumes various roles that require the performance of many difficult tasks.”).
2
See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rules 3.1-3.9 (discussing professional responsibilities
attendant to the lawyer’s role as advocate).
3
Id. at Rules 2.1-2.4 (discussing professional responsibilities attendant to the lawyer’s role as advisor). See also
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 17 (Oxford 2008) (noting that when acting as business counsel, “the
lawyer is interested…in anticipating what the court might do and in shaping his client's conduct to his client's desires
in view of that anticipation.”).
4
See supra note 1, at EC 7-3.
5
Id. at EC 7-5 (“A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving his professional opinion as to what
he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on the matter at hand and by informing his client of
the practical effect of such decision.”).
1
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analyze the various options and advise the client regarding the likely outcome of each, so that the
client can make an informed decision.6
Outcome prediction, therefore, is an essential lawyering skill. Lawyers, particularly
litigators, cannot provide effective counsel to clients if they cannot accurately assess the potential
outcomes of litigation and other legal matters and advise their clients accordingly.7 Outcome
prediction is basically the legal equivalent of prognosis in medicine: an attempt to forecast the
consequences of various courses of action so that the lawyer can help the client make informed
decisions about matters of significant consequence to the client. It pervades the practice of law,
just as it does the practice of medicine. Every time a criminal defense attorney advises a client
whether to accept a plea agreement; every time a civil litigator advises a prospective plaintiff
whether to initiate a lawsuit, or to settle a lawsuit; every time a tax lawyer advises a client
whether to take an aggressive deduction on the client’s return-- in all of these circumstances and
many more, the lawyer is called upon to serve as a prognosticator as part of the lawyer’s role as
advisor.
Yet in spite of the enormous importance of outcome prediction to the practice of law, the
academic legal literature is lacking any thoroughgoing analysis of how outcome prediction in the
law actually works, and how it might be improved upon.8 What literature there is concerning
outcome prediction in the law has mainly been generated by scholars in cognate disciplines, such
as artificial intelligence and political science, and it is primarily concerned with generating

Id. at EC 7-8 (“A lawyer should advise his client of the possible effect of each legal alternative.”).
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897) (arguing that how law is a
profession precisely because people are willing to pay lawyers to advocate on their behalf and to advise them as to
possible legal consequences they may face).
8
This lack of attention in the literature may well be because, to put it simply, predictions are difficult, and lawyers
have traditionally been less than stellar at making outcome predictions. See NANCY L. SCHULTZ & LOUIS J. SIRICO,
JR., LEGAL WRITING AND OTHER LAWYERING SKILLS 184 (6th ed. 2014) (“trying to predict what parties, witnesses,
judges, and juries are likely to do is often little more than an educated guessing game.”); See also infra Part III.
6
7

4
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/152

4

Osbeck:

predictive models.9 What remains wanting is a thorough understanding of the actual tools
lawyers use to formulate outcome predictions, and a critical assessment of their effectiveness.
This article attempts to fill the void in the legal academic literature concerning outcome
prediction. It does so by first examining how outcome prediction has traditionally functioned in
the practice of law, whereby lawyers have relied on three principal tools: (1) legal analysis (of a
particular sort I refer to as the “element-focused analysis”); (2) lawyerly experience; and (3) the
use of certain types of empirical information. The article then evaluates critically the
effectiveness of these traditional tools, focusing on a variety of issues that impede accurate
predictions. The article gives particular attention to problems that inherently afflict the “elementfocused analysis” that lawyers have long relied upon to inform outcome predictions, since this
topic has received almost no attention in the scholarly literature. Lastly, the article discusses how
outcome prediction in the practice of law might be improved upon going forward, thanks to
recent advances in data science. It concludes that while the traditional tools that lawyers use to
make outcome predictions (particularly the element-focused analysis) have a number of
shortcomings that lead to significant inaccuracy, the new tools that rely upon predictive analytics
offer a glimmer of hope that lawyers going forward will be better at making outcome predictions
than they traditionally have been.
Part I of the article discusses in detail the reasons why outcome prediction is a vital part of
practicing law. Part II looks at the tools lawyers have traditionally used to make outcome
predictions. It examines in detail each of the three principal tools and the ways in which lawyers

9

See, e.g., Lee Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The Next Step Forward, 33 MINN. L. REV. 455 (1949); Fred Kort, Predicting
Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: a Quantitative Analysis of the Right to Counsel Cases, 51 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1 (1957); Schubert, A Psychoanalytic Model of the Supreme Court, 5 AM. BEHAVIOR SCIENTIST 14 (1961);
Franklin M. Fisher, The Mathematical Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Quantitative
Methods, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321 (1958).
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use them in practice. Part III examines the problems and limitations that afflict the traditional
tools of outcome prediction, again with a particular focus on the element-focused analysis that
has traditionally played a vital role in outcome prediction, but is largely ignored in the literature.
And finally, Part IV of the article discusses the prospects going forward for employing predictive
analytics to help lawyers make more accurate outcome predictions.
I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF OUTCOME PREDICTION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW

The legal profession is not unique in its need for accurate outcome predictions. In a number
of professional fields, practitioners need to be able to assess the likelihood of potential outcomes.
In the field of medicine, for example, doctors need to make prognoses to properly assess
treatment options; in the field of investment advising, stockbrokers strive to provide their clients
an accurate assessment of a stock’s likely prospects in the market; and in the field of sports,
prognosticators are valued not only for the assistance they can provide gamblers, but also for
such things as evaluating the potential success of prospective players.
In the practice of law, lawyers need to assess the likely outcome of litigation matters for
several important reasons. First, the decision whether to originate a litigation matter requires a
reasonable balancing of costs versus expected benefits, and a significant component of this
calculation is an estimation of the client’s likelihood of success. Second, deciding whether to
accept a settlement offer, whether in the criminal or civil context, depends upon a reasonable
assessment of the likely outcome in the absence of a settlement. And third, outside of a litigation
context, transactional lawyers often need to assess the likely outcomes of the various decisions
confronting their business clients (for example, the prospects of litigation arising from a
proposed business decision), and this too requires a reasonable prediction as to what is likely to
happen if the client proceeds in a certain manner. For each of these reasons, as well as some

6
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other more minor reasons, outcome prediction forms an important part of a lawyer’s role when
the lawyer acts as a advisor rather than an advocate.10
A. The Importance of Outcome Prediction in Case Selection
First, outcome prediction is vital to efficient case selection. When a civil litigator or
prosecutor is evaluating whether to initiate an action, the lawyer needs to first assess the merits
of the prospective case,11 which in turn requires the lawyer to evaluate the likelihood of
success.12
The lawyer has an ethical obligation not to pursue a spurious action13 (or, in the case of a
prosecutor, to refrain from prosecuting an action the lawyer knows is unsupported by probable
cause14), and this requires an assessment as to the likelihood of winning. If there is little or no
chance of success, then the lawyer needs to evaluate carefully the lawyer’s ethical obligations.
But even assuming these ethical obligations are satisfied, the lawyer must still make an
outcome prediction to properly assess the case. First, the lawyer has a fiduciary obligation to act
in accordance with the client’s interests,15 and this requires (among other thing), a risk/benefit
analysis, balancing the costs of litigation against the possible recovery.16
Second, from the perspective of the lawyer’s own pecuniary interests, outcome prediction is
often important in determining whether the action is worth pursuing from the point of view of the

See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction – or – How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start
Preparing for the Data Stream Future Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 912 (2013) (“Prediction is a
core component of the guidance that many lawyers offer. Indeed, it is by generating informed answers to these types
of questions that many lawyers earn their respective wages.”).
11
George L. Priest & Benjamin Kline, Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEG. STUDIES 1, 4 (1984); THOMAS
A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 90 (9th ed. 2015).
12
Edie Green & Brian Bornstein, Cloudy Forecasts, 47 A.P.R. TRIAL 28, 29 (2011) (“when evaluating a case’s
potential, the lawyer weighs the costs and benefits based upon an educated guess as to the case’s outcome.”).
13
ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 2, at 3.1.
14
Id. at 3.8.
15
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48, 49 (2000).
16
Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of Big Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1357, 1370-1371
(2015) (describing research indicating that lawyers undertake this type of analysis in assessing the validity of
prospective actions); Green & Bornstain, supra note 12, at 29.
10
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lawyer or the lawyer’s firm, particularly in contingency citations, when the lawyer has a stake in
the litigation.17 If, for example, a plaintiff’s lawyer overestimates either the likelihood of success
or the likely amount of the recovery, the client is not going to be happy with the result because
the recovery is less than expected, and/or the lawyer’s law firm will be unhappy, if the firm has a
contingent interest in the litigation and the ultimate recovery does not justify the firm’s
expenditure on the matter. Likewise, if a prosecutor overestimates the likelihood of success on a
criminal action, this increases the risk of an acquittal that might otherwise have resulted in a plea
bargain. And even if a plea is ultimately entered, the costs required to obtain that plea will likely
exceed what they would have been had the prosecution made a more reasonable offer early in the
litigation process.
Thus, in both the civil and criminal contexts, outcome prediction is an important part of the
initial case assessment that takes place before an action is originated.
B. The Importance of Outcome Prediction in Making Settlement Decisions
Outcome prediction is perhaps even more important in the context of settlement negotiations,
given that a critical component of rational negotiation is a reasonable assessment of the likely
outcome of the case in the absence of a negotiated settlement agreement.18
Imagine, for example, that you come home from work one night, and waiting for you in the
shadows are several police officers. They arrest you, charge you with a crime, and cart you off to
jail. Hopefully, you are able to obtain bail and gain your release. And now it’s time to begin
working on your defense. At that point, you earnestly want a lawyer to assist you.

In a contingency action, the plaintiff’s lawyer’s fee is dependent on the recovery. Typically, such lawyers get a
percentage of the final recovery (capped by state rules), with the percentage amount depending on whether and
when the matter is settled, or whether it proceeds to trial and/or appeal. See, e.g., Mauet, supra note 11, at 97-99.
18
George Lowenstein, et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pre-trial Bargaining, 22 J. LEG. STUDIES
135, 136-137 (1993) (describing the generally accepted model of settlement, whereby cases that fail to settle are
those in which the plaintiff overstates and/or the defendant underestimates the expected value of going to trial).
17

8
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So what would you look for in that lawyer? You might be inclined to look for a Perry Mason
type—a brilliant trial lawyer who could prove your innocence at trial. But that may not be your
wisest option. For in the vast majority of both criminal and civil cases, the outcome is
determined not through jury trials, but rather through negotiation and plea bargaining.19 And so
you would probably be better served by focusing on a lawyer who was skilled at negotiation, and
at providing you with sage advice as to the desirability of accepting whatever plea bargain that
the prosecution may ultimately offer.20
In order to provide such counsel, your lawyer will have to properly assess your case, which
involves a risk/benefit analysis. Specifically, your lawyer must balance the prospect of a sure
adverse result (e.g., a one-year prison term) against a potentially worse adverse result (e.g., a
twenty-year prison term), if your defense fails at trial and you are convicted.21 And that, in turn,
requires your lawyer to forecast both the likelihood of losing at trial should you reject the
prosecutor’s plea bargain, and the length of the sentence you are likely to receive if you are
convicted at trial.22
Reasonable outcome prediction is also essential to making wise decisions regarding
settlement prospects in the civil context. In order to provide sage counsel as to the desirability of
accepting any given settlement offer, a lawyer must be able to properly assess the odds of

19

Laura A. Kaster, Cognitive Barriers to Valuing Your Case for Settlement or Mediation: Improving Your Risk
Assessment, 269 N.J. LAWYER 43, 43, n. 1 (discussing an ABA study on pretrial settlement rates in federal court,
concluding that over 95% of cases end in settlement).
20
These two skills are interrelated, however: a lawyer with a widespread reputation for strong trial skills is likely to
have an advantage in terms of settlement clout over a less skilled trial lawyer, since opposing counsel will be less
inclined to take their chances at trial going against a skilled trial lawyer.
21
See Stephano Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2496-2527 (2004).
22
Holmes, supra note 7, at 457 (“People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk
of coming against what is so much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this
danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force
through the instrumentality of the courts.”).
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winning at trial, and the potential ramifications of losing at trial.23 Suppose, for example, that the
lawyer is defending a company in a breach of contract action. The plaintiff seeks one million
dollars in damages for the breach. And the defendant has made an offer of one hundred thousand
dollars. In that situation, whether the $100k settlement offer is reasonable (from the defendant’s
perspective) depends, at least as a starting point, upon the likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict, the
likely amount of any verdict, and the anticipated costs (primarily attorney’s fees) of proceeding
to trial.24 And the more inaccurate the defendant’s assessment of the case, the more money the
defendant is likely to lose, either by paying too much in settlement, or by taking an unjustified
risk at trial.25 And the same is true of the plaintiff. The more inaccurate the plaintiff’s
assessment, the less the plaintiff is likely to recover, either by accepting too little in settlement,

23

Robert N. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950, 959-77 (1979); Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 16, at 1375-1377.
24
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
399 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L & ECON. 61 (1971); Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 23, at 960.
25
In mathematical terms, the settlement offer (S) is reasonable from the defendant’s perspective if: S ≤ (P x V) + C
(where P is the probability of a plaintiff’s verdict, V is the likely size of the verdict, and C is the cost of proceeding
to trial). So if the defense lawyer puts the probability of a plaintiff’s verdict (P) at 15%, the potential verdict amount
(V) at $1MM, and the costs of additional litigation to trial (C) at $25,000, then the $100,000 settlement amount is
reasonable, since the value of (P x V) + C is $175,000 in that hypothetical. Conversely, if the plaintiff refuses to
settle the case for $175,000, then it would be prudent for the defendant to take its chances at trial, assuming it isn’t
risk averse for some other rational reason (e.g., the company is uninsured and would be bankrupted by a $1MM
verdict, but could absorb some lesser amount, such as $200,000). See generally Priest & Kline, supra note 11, at 1213; Mauet, supra note 11, at 408-413 (discussing in depth this type of settlement calculation). This formula is overly
simplified, of course. There are other potential costs, such as tax consequences, bad publicity, etc., that must be
factored into the equation as well. Furthermore, it may sometimes be reasonable for a defendant (or its insurer) to
offer less in settlement than the formula would indicate is reasonable, in hopes of deterring future litigation. On the
simple formula set out above, even if the likelihood of a successful recovery is zero (because P is zero), it would still
be rational for the defendant to settle for an amount greater than zero but less than the cost of going to trial, which is
generally not insignificant. But if the defendant settles right away for nuisance value, as the simple formula would
prescribe, there is little to prevent unscrupulous plaintiffs from filing frivolous lawsuits in hopes of scoring a quick
settlement. So the defendant has an incentive to require the plaintiff to prove up its case, which helps to eliminate
spurious cases, and also requires the plaintiff to incur costs that would serve as a deterrent to filing a lawsuit. The
formula is also overly simplified with respect to determining the expected value of V, the potential verdict. While
this amount might be fairly definite in some types of actions, such as breach of contract actions in which plaintiffs
seeks a set amount, in other types of actions, such as negligence actions, estimating the potential recovery is more
difficult. In those types of actions, there will a range of potential verdicts (e.g., the defense lawyer may reasonably
assess the expected verdict at anywhere from $100,000 to $1MM). See Mauet, supra note 11, at 408-409.
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or by taking an unjustified risk at trial.26 So accurate outcome prediction is essential to a lawyer’s
ability to provide sound advice to the client regarding settlement prospects.
Furthermore, the ability of lawyers to effectively advise clients as to the likely outcome of
litigation matters affects more than just individual clients. For unless both lawyers in a litigation
matter properly assess the likelihood of a particular outcome, the efficiency of the settlement
process itself suffers. Presumably, the goal of settlement should be to avoid wasted time,
aggravation, and money--in addition to judicial resources--by short-circuiting the litigation
process, so that roughly the same result is reached in settlement that would have been reached at
trial, without all the additional negatives (e.g., attorney’s fees and aggravation). But if either or
both lawyers have unrealistic expectations of their client’s likelihood of success at trial, then an
efficient settlement won’t be reached.27 If, for example, the plaintiff’s lawyer overestimates the
likelihood of success, then some cases that shouldn’t proceed to trial will; conversely, if the
plaintiff’s lawyer underestimates the likelihood of success and decides not to pursue vigorously a
meritorious action, then some deserving plaintiffs will settle for less than fair compensation.28
Thus, the ability to make reasonably accurate predictions regarding litigation outcomes is key
to the efficiency of our litigation system as a whole. And the same is true with respect to the
efficiency of our criminal justice system. If prosecutors make errant judgments about the likely
result of potential prosecutions, then the system will misallocate judicial and prosecutorial

26

See Charles J. Snyder, Moneyball Lawyering, 65 ARK. L. REV. 837, 854 (2012).
Jane Goodman-Delahanty, et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyer Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16
PSYCHOLOGY, PUB. POLICY & LAW 133, 134 (2010) (“At the end of the day, it is accurate predictions of the lawyer
that enable the justice system to function smoothly.”). A similar cost/benefit analysis is required for efficient
litigation strategy. To decide whether a particular motion is warranted, for example, or whether it is worthwhile to
pursue a certain type of evidence in support of a claim or defense, requires a balancing of the costs versus the
anticipated likelihood of success. See Snyder, supra note 26, at 854.
28
Id., at 134-135; Kastor, supra note 19, at 43, 46.
27
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resources, resulting in fewer convictions of those who deserve to be convicted, and a greater
waste of time and resources trying to convict those who merit lesser plea bargains.
C. The Importance of Outcome Prediction in Transactional Practice
While outcome prediction is most clearly at issue in litigation matters, the importance of
outcome prediction is not confined to litigation. Transactional lawyers also need to assess
potential outcomes to properly counsel their clients. A tax attorney advising a client whether to
take a certain deduction, for example, must analyze both the likelihood of an audit as well as the
likely outcome should the IRS decide to pursue an audit.
Often, potential litigation is an important contingency that individuals and companies have
to consider when they enter into business transactions. If there is a possibility that the
contemplated transaction will involve litigation, then both the potential consequences of that
litigation and the expected costs of that litigation must be factored into the cost/benefit analysis
as the client determines whether to go forward with the deal. And in order to properly assess the
costs and benefits of the prospective transaction, the transactional lawyer (often in conjunction
with a litigator) must make a prediction with respect to the likely outcome of the potential
litigation.29
Suppose for example, a group of investors is considering purchasing a tract of real estate in
order to develop it into a private golf and ski resort. The client is interested in investing tens of
millions of dollars to purchase a large tract of undeveloped land, which the client thinks could
ultimately be developed into parcels worth several hundred million dollars in the aggregate.
There is, however, one not-so-little hitch: title to the land is in dispute, and that title is the subject

29

See The Importance of Product Liability Risk Assessment in Business Valuation and Acquisitions, THE
METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Sept. 13, 2017, at 1 (arguing that transactional lawyers should enlist
experienced litigators in assessing product liability risks in connection with business valuations and acquisitions).
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of a pending lawsuit. Both the client (i.e., the prospective buyer), and the seller believe that the
seller’s pending quiet-title action is likely to succeed, and yet it is crucially important to get a
sense of just how likely the odds of success are, so that the client can make a rational decision
whether to invest in the property at all, and if so, how much to invest. The difference between a
five percent likelihood that the quiet title action would fail versus a 20 percent likelihood that it
would fail will make a significant difference in the amount the client is willing to pay for the
property. In this type of situation, the transactional lawyer’s job is to provide (probably in
conjunction with firm’s litigation attorneys) the best possible outcome prediction as to the quiet
title action so that the client can make an informed choice whether to proceed with the
purchase.30
The transactional client’s decision whether to proceed with a deal, and if so, how much to
invest in it, may also hinge on outcome predictions regarding other types of proceedings, such as
the prospects for proposed legislation or regulatory action.31 For example, a company’s decision
whether to build a new plant in a particular location may hinge in large part on a proposed
regulation that affects potential liability for environmental concerns. In that instance, the
transactional lawyer may turn to the firm’s regulatory lawyers for guidance as to the likely
prospects for agency approval.
There are other contingencies transactional lawyers need to consider as well. They need to
make predictions as to uncertainties such as whether necessary licenses and permits can be
obtained, and if so, how quickly; whether the Justice Department will approve a proposed

30

See Id.
The electronic research providers are now providing tools to assist with these types of outcome prediction; see,
e.g., Lexis’ Legislative Outlook tool.
31
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merger; or whether adequate financing will be available to fund the transaction. All of these
require the transactional lawyer to engage in some degree of prognostication.32
Thus, outcome prediction is a vital component of client counseling. The client will have
difficulty making important decisions unless the client has confidence in the lawyer’s ability to
make accurate outcome predictions. And while this article focuses mostly upon outcome
prediction in the context of litigation, importance of outcome prediction is not limited to that area
of the law, and much of what is discussed below applies in the transactional context as well.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL TOOLS OF OUTCOME PREDICTION

The principal tools lawyers have traditionally used to predict case outcomes are: (1) an
element-focused analysis of each asserted cause of action and defense in the case, looking to
prior decisional law to determine whether these elements are met; (2) lawyerly experience; and
(3) certain types of empirical information that may provide insight into how a prospective judge
or jury would decide the instant matter. This section examines the nature of these tools, and Part
III examines their shortcomings.
A. The Element-Focused Analysis
The foundational tool lawyers have traditionally used to assess cases, particularly in the early
stages of a dispute, is what I have been calling an “element-focused analysis” of the causes of
action and defenses. In undertaking this type of analysis, the lawyer anticipates the process the
trier of fact will need to follow in its assessment of the claim by analytically breaking down the
cause of action or defense into its constituent elements, then determining for each element
whether it applies in light of the known facts in order to predict the likely outcome.33

32

See LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING & ANALYSIS 3-4 (3d. ed. 2011).
See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 16, at 1342; RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ET AL, LEGAL RESEARCH AND
LEGAL WRITING 9-16 (8th ed. 2017).
33
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(Occasionally, courts will employ other types of tests, e.g., a factor test,34 in reaching their
determinations, but the most fundamental type of analysis in judicial decision-making revolves
around an analysis of the elements of the various causes-of-action and defenses.) The lawyer
then goes through the same process with respect to each potential defense. In other words, when
assessing the viability of a claim or potential claim, the lawyer examines, for each cause of
action that has or might be alleged, the various elements and defenses that are applicable, and
then makes a separate assessment as to the viability of each such element or defense. The lawyer
can then assess the likely outcome of the cause of action overall, since (by definition) a cause of
action fails if any element is not met, or if any (complete) defense applies.35
Suppose, for example, that a potential client wants to bring a cause of action for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In most states, a cause of action for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) requires the plaintiff to establish four
elements: (1) that the conduct was intentional or reckless, (2) that the behavior in question
caused the emotional distress, (3) that the defendant’s conduct was “outrageous,” and (4) that the
resulting emotional distress was severe. 36 The traditional element-focused analysis proceeds by

34

In an equitable matter, such as a child custody determination, for example, courts balance various factors such as
the parents’ employment status, or a parents’ drug/alcohol abuse, in deciding what custody arrangement is in the
best interests of the child. Presumably, however, judicial decisions involving such factor tests are even more difficult
to predict than those involving element focused analyses, since they involve a complicated weighing and a balancing
of the various factors to determine whether the standard applies, and not just a “checking off” of those requirements
that need to be met to fall within the scope of a legal rule. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court
1991 Term—Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HOW. L. REV. 22, 58-59 (1992); Kevin Smith,
Practical Jurisprudence: Deconstructing and Synthesizing the Art and Science of Thinking Like a Lawyer, 29 U.
MEMPHIS L. REV. 1, 58-61 (1998) (discussing how standards operate in legal analyses and arguing that legal
standards are less constraining than rules).
35
Smith, supra note 34 at 47-57 (1998) (discussing how elements operate in applying legal rules to facts, and
arguing that rules are essentially conditional [i.e.,“if/then” statements] comprised of triggering conditions in the
form of elements). See also Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 16, at 1342 (“This application of law to facts would
yield an estimate about probabilities: that is, a prediction of the likelihood that a given rule would govern a given
scenario.”).
36
Most states follow Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 requirements, which lays out these four elements of the
tort.
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evaluating each of these elements in turn, trying to assess whether, in light of the known facts,
each one would be deemed applicable, were the court or jury to evaluate the potential case. Then,
having analyzed each element (and any applicable defenses, such as the defense of privilege), the
lawyer tries to make a projection as to the likelihood of success of the cause of action as a whole,
based on the likelihood that each component element is met.
In determining whether the elements of a cause of action are met, the traditional analysis
evaluates each element primarily in light of the case precedents interpreting that element. 37
Thus, the traditional analysis relies heavily upon legal research to find precedents that can be
compared and contrasted on their facts with the instant case to determine whether the element is
met.38 Suppose, for example, that the potential defendant in our hypothetical IIED case is a
teacher who yelled and cursed at the potential plaintiff, who was a 12-year-old student. Does that
behavior constitute “outrageous conduct” for purposes of establishing element (3) of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress? To answer this question, the lawyer traditionally
starts by researching case law in the appropriate jurisdiction (or assigning the research to an
associate), looking for IIED cases that shed light on the meaning of “outrageous conduct.” 39
Having located relevant precedents on this issue, the lawyer then looks at two things: (1)
whether the courts promulgate any rules, factors, or principles (explicit or implicit) that outline
the boundaries of that element (e.g., rules that define “outrageous conduct,”) and (2) whether the

37

The elements themselves may derive either from a textual source (e.g., a statute) or from the common law (e.g., a
cause of action in tort, such as IIED). See Smith, supra note 34, at 49.
38
See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STANFORD L. REV. 571, 576-579 (1987) (describing in depth how precedent
functions at a theoretical level). See also Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 16, at 1371-1372.
39
Case-law precedents are not the exclusive interpretive tools, however; other interpretive aids, such as scholarly
commentary, may also be used to shed light on the meaning and applicability of the various elements. With respect
to IIED, for example, the comments and illustrations that accompany § 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts are
generally considered important persuasive authorities for interpreting the elements set out in the model rule.
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defendant’s behavior in the instant case is similar to the behavior of the defendants in those cases
in which courts have found the element to be met.40
As regards the first criterion, the law in most states follows the Restatement in requiring a
very high threshold for outrageous conduct: it must be conduct "so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."41 The second criterion—factual
similarity between the precedent case and the instant case—is key for fleshing out the
applicability of abstract rules, such as the one quoted above. If the factual circumstances are
sufficiently and relevantly similar, then the lawyer concludes that the element of outrageous
conduct is likely satisfied, and will move on to the next element; if the behavior is not on par,
then the element is not met.42 Once a determination is made with respect to each element, the
cause of action as a whole can be evaluated, since a cause of action exists only if every element
is established.43
Of course, the degree of confidence the lawyer has in a particular outcome prediction
depends upon how confident the lawyer is with respect to each element. While lawyers typically
don’t assign percentages to the individual elements (e.g., a 60% chance the jury will find the
element of causation is met), they do tend to qualify their determinations broadly (e.g., it is
“highly likely” or just “more likely than not” that the jury will find the conduct to be
outrageous).44 And this of course affects their assessment of the cause of action as a whole. Thus,

40

Smith, supra note 34, at 40-46 (discussing the synthesis of legal rules from precedents and their application to
facts).
41
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
42
Smith, supra note 34, at 45 (“the doctrine of stare decisis is quite complex, but it can be reasonably captured by a
single phrase: similar facts, same law, same result.”).
43
See Neumann, et al., supra note 33, at 121.
44
Id. at 164.
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if the lawyer feels that it is highly likely the jury will find each element of IIED to be met, then
the lawyer can be quite confident in predicting that a cause of action for IIED will succeed. 45
Conversely, if the lawyer determines that it is just slightly more likely than not that one or more
of the elements is met, then the lawyer will make a less confident prediction.
Research memoranda (a.k.a. “legal memoranda,” “formal office memoranda”) have
traditionally been the vehicles through which lawyers record and/or convey their outcome
predictions.46 And, for many years, researching and preparing such memoranda occupied the
lion’s share of a typical junior attorney’s time. 47 Traditionally in these memoranda, the lawyer
started with a question presented and a short answer to the question presented. This was followed
by a summary of the facts, and then a detailed element-by-element analysis of one or more
causes of action and/or defenses, followed by a brief conclusion that assessed the viability of the
overall action.48 (Some experienced lawyers, however, may prefer that the lawyer undertaking a
research project confine the scope of the memorandum to explaining the legal requirements for
each individual element and/or defense, leaving the overall analysis as to the viability of the
overall cause of action to the senior lawyer.) Frequently, the research memorandum will then

45

But see infra section III (A) (6).
See Neumann, supra note 33, at 159 (“An office memorandum predicts how the law will treat the client.”); JOHN
C. DERNBACH, ET AL., LEGAL WRITING & LEGAL METHOD 259-260 (4th ed. 2010); Edwards, supra note 32, at 127
(“Making an accurate prediction, then, is the function of an office memo.”).
47
Kirsten Davis, The Reports of My Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: Reading and Writing Objective Legal
Memoranda in a Mobile Computing Age, 92 OR. L. REV. 471, 474 (2013) (summarizing the traditional use of the
office memorandum and describing a survey of law school graduates and their continued use of traditional legal
memoranda, as well as more contemporary alternatives, such as short email memos).
48
RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR, ET AL., LEGAL WRITING 123-126 (3d ed. 2015). Of course, legal memoranda have
other possible uses as well. For example, a legal memorandum can be used merely to summarize the law on a
particular topic, without applying that law to the facts in question. Similarly, it can be used to merely make the best
arguments the clients can make in light of the law and the facts, without necessarily trying to predict a likely
outcome. However, the main use of a legal memorandum traditionally has been to assess the client’s case and to
predict the likely outcome. Neumann, supra note 33, at 159.
46
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form the basis for an advice letter to the client, through which the senior lawyer can convey the
results of the element-focused analysis to the client, and advise the client accordingly.49
Most often, this analysis takes place at the beginning of the litigation process, where the
lawyers for the parties are trying to ascertain how they should respond to a potential litigation
matter (e.g., whether to file a claim, if they represent the plaintiff, or whether to make an early
settlement offer if they represent the defendant).50 As discussed in Section I above, the plaintiff’s
lawyer needs to evaluate the potential amount and the likelihood of a potential jury verdict in
order to determine whether filing the action is justified, and the defendant’s lawyer needs to
assess the client’s potential exposure in order to evaluate early settlement options and in order to
set a strategy and budget for case management purposes.51
In recent years, such formal legal memoranda have been used less frequently by lawyers,
mainly due to the cost of preparing them.52 As clients have become more cost conscious, lawyers
have tried to become more cost efficient, relying less on formal memoranda and more on shorter,
informal memoranda, email memoranda, and oral research reports.53 So while it may still make
financial sense for a law firm to have an associate prepare a traditional office memorandum in a
high-stakes matter, where cost-containment is not a pressing consideration, it may not make
sense in a more mundane litigation matter.
Still, regardless of the vehicle through which lawyers convey their analyses, the elementfocused analysis, based on legal research, has formed the backbone of the traditional approach to

49

Edwards, supra note 32, at 4, 127; CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 207, 210-211 (7th ed.
2014); Dernbach, et al., supra note 46, at 259.
50
See Mauet, supra note 11 at 5-7(describing the initial case-evaluation process).
51
See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
52
See Kristen Robbins-Tiscone, From Snail Mail to Email: The Traditional Legal Memorandum in the Twenty-First
Century, 58 J. LEG. EDUC. 32, 32-36 (2008) (describing survey results showing a reduced use of formal legal
memoranda in the practice of law).
53
Id. at 32, 41-42.
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outcome prediction and remains an important predictive important tool. It is still one of the
principal tools lawyers use to assess cases, particularly at the beginning of a litigation matter.54 It
is ALSO one that can at least partially be delegated to more junior lawyers, since it takes full
advantage of the legal research, writing, and analysis skills that law students develop in law
school.55
B. Lawyerly Experience
Another important resource that lawyers rely on when making outcome predictions is
lawyerly experience. Seasoned lawyers instinctively temper the predictive analysis of an
associate’s legal memorandum with their own experience in assessing the likely outcome of
cases.56 An experienced plaintiffs’ lawyer, for example, may know from past experience that
plaintiffs’ verdicts for a cause of action such as IIED are relatively uncommon, and the
experienced lawyer will temper accordingly the tendency of junior lawyers to skew the analysis
in favor of the client.57 Furthermore, the element-focused analysis contained in a typical research
memorandum often sheds more light on how likely an action is to survive a motion to dismiss or
a summary judgment motion, rather than the likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict at trial. In the case
of IIED, for example, most of the reported cases are appeals from dismissals for failure to state a
cause of action, or appeals from summary judgment orders. Thus, they provide little guidance for
how a jury is likely to resolve a matter that survives a dispositive motion and proceeds to trial.

54

Neumann, supra note 33 at 40-45 (discussing the steps involved in an element-focused analysis and describing it
as the principal tool of predictive writing).
55
For this reason, learning to draft memoranda is still one of the principal topics taught in nearly all first-year legal
writing classes, and it occupies an important place in nearly all first-year legal writing textbooks. See, e.g.,
Neumann, supra note 33, at 159-167; Edwards, supra note 32, at 127-143; Dernbach, et al, supra note 46 at 259291; Calleros, supra note 49, at 189-343.
56
CLARENCE MORRIS, HOW LAWYERS THINK 11-19 (1937).
57
See Suzanne E. Rowe, Legal Research, Legal Writing, and Legal Analysis: Putting Law School Into Practice, 29
STETSON L. REV. 1193, 1197-1198; Amanda L. Smith, Preparing for Practice Beyond the Bench Opinion-Writing
as the Heart and Soul of First Semester Legal Writing, 18 J. LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE 263, 282 (2012) (arguing
that most inexperienced researchers skew the analysis in favor of the client).
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An experienced lawyer may also consider other factors, besides the doctrinal considerations
that are analyzed in a traditional element-focused analysis, in trying to predict the likely outcome
of a litigation matter. For example, an experienced lawyer may take into account the background
and perceived predilections of the individual judge(s) involved in the case,58 particularly if the
lawyer has personal experiences to draw on with respect to these variables. The experienced
lawyer may also factor in non-doctrinal considerations such as the equities of the lawsuit, the
sympathetic or not-so-sympathetic nature of the parties, the reputation of the opposing counsel,
etc.59
In drawing upon experience to inform outcome prediction, the lawyer is not necessarily
confined to the lawyer’s own personal experience. Rather, the lawyer may draw upon the opinion
of more seasoned lawyers (or expert consultants), in much the same way that a physician may
draw upon the experience of more seasoned physicians in making a diagnosis.60 In either case,
anecdotal evidence tempers the purely legal emphasis of the element-focused analysis.
This anecdotal evidence thus enables the experienced lawyer to take a more holistic approach
to outcome prediction.61 The lawyer relies not just a legalistic examination of the constituent
parts of a particular cause of action, but also on a more “gestalt” view of the case (based on the
lawyer’s intuition) that takes into account a broader range of potentially relevant
considerations.62 Again, the parallel to medicine presents itself. Just as an experienced physician

58

See Daniel Schneider, Assessing and Predicting Who Wins Federal Tax Trial Decisions, 37 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 473, 509-514 (2002) (arguing that a judge's background traits, such as gender, education, and past work
experience, are highly predictive of case outcomes); Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 16, at 1342-1343
(experiential knowledge supplements, and is sometimes more important than, the legal rules for purposes of
outcome prediction).
59
See Mauet, supra note 11, at 46.
60
See Cloudy Forecasts, supra note 26, at 31-32 (discussing research showing that lawyers who consult with
experienced colleagues regarding their outcome predictions make more accurate predictions).
61
See Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton, Can Hunches Be Rational?, 41 J L. ECON. & POLICY 155, 172 (2007).
62
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 107 (2008).
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may rely not only on a checklist of symptoms in making a diagnosis, but also on the physician’s
intuitive sense regarding the patient’s overall presentation, so too the experienced lawyer may
rely at least in part on whether the case “feels” like a winner, drawing on the lawyer’s
experience-based intuitions about the strength of the case.63 And this may well track (at least in
part) the manner in which judges and juries reach decisions.64 There is significant anecdotal and
other evidence that judges and juries do not decide cases merely by analyzing the individual
elements and defenses; rather, they balance that analysis against their intuitive sense of what
justice demands in an individual case.65 If so, then balancing the element-focused analysis with
the lawyer’s intuitive sense as to the likely outcome of a case, where this intuition is ultimately
derived from experience, would reasonably be expected to improve the accuracy of the lawyer’s
outcome prediction. 66
C. Empirical Information
The third principal tool that lawyers have traditionally used to forecast case outcomes is
empirical information about cases. While this tool has not historically been as widely used as the
first two tools discussed above, it is likely to become increasingly important in this age of data
analytics, as discussed in Part IV.

63

Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 16, at 1346, notes 24, 25 (discussing research indicating that lawyers draw
heavily upon their own experiences in making decisions).
64
Posner, supra note 62, at 108 (“Thus, the more experienced the judge, the more confidence he is apt to repose in
his intuitive reactions…”); Joseph C. Hutchinson Jr., The Role of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision-Making, 14
CORNELL L. Q. 274, 284 (1929); Mark Modak-Trusan, A Pragmatic Justification of the Judicial Hunch, 35 U.
RICHMOND L. REV. 35 (2001).
65
See Posner, supra note 62, at 110.
66
There is reason to believe that this type of reflective balancing between intuition derived from experience, on the
one hand, and more deliberate analytical processes, on the other, is not confined to legal reasoning, but may instead
be a fundamental feature of human cognition. See Gigerenzer & Brighton, supra note 61, at 156 (“Simple heuristics
that ignore information can be better—faster, more frugal, and more accurate—than complex strategies that use all
available information.”). But see Davis, supra note 47, at 494-499 (describing some cognitive biases that may creep
in when lawyers rely on intuition to evaluate potential case outcomes).
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The empirical information that has traditionally been used to guide outcome predictions has
been derived from several sources. The oldest and most widely used source is the jury verdict
reporter, which summarizes jury verdicts by subject matter so that lawyers can see how similar
cases have been resolved in the past, and can gain an understanding of the expected verdict range
in similar cases.67 Jury verdict reporters are published in most jurisdictions. They are prepared by
private entities,68 and the information comes in part from publicly available court records, and in
part from the attorneys that were involved in the cases.69 Generally, the reporters organize the
case summaries by type of claim, type of injury, jurisdiction, amount, plaintiff’s demographics,
the insurer’s settlement history, etc.70 Originally, jury verdict reporters were published in print in
a newsletter format. Most of them are now available online as well, and many of them provide
access to large online databases of case information that the lawyer can search by category.
Some of them (particularly in larger states) offer research services as well, whereby a staff
researcher will search for cases in the database that are on par with the case the lawyer is
working on.71
The purpose of jury verdict reporters is to provide lawyers information about how cases that
are similar to the cases they are working on have been resolved. Lawyers can then use this
information to make reasonable predictions as to the range of expected jury verdicts in similar
cases.72 Thus, the emphasis is different from the element-focused analysis discussed above, in

67

See Mauet, supra note 11, at 406.
Two of the largest commercial jury verdict reporters are VerdictSearch (www.verdictsearch.com) and the National
Association of Jury Verdict Publishers (www.juryverdicts.com).
69
See, e.g., website for VerdictSearch, supra note 68, at www.verdictsearch.com/solutions/online verdict search
tool.
70
The online commercial research providers also offer verdict research tools. Westlaw, for example, has a tool
called Jury Verdicts and Settlements, and Lexis offers a tool by the same name, as well as a related tool called
Verdict and Settlement Analyzer.
71
See, e.g., the website for VerdictSerch, supra note 68, at www.verdictsearch.com/solutions/phone research
service.
72
Mauet, supra note 11, at 46.
68
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that jury verdict reporters provide guidance as to what is likely to happen after a case makes it to
trial. The traditional element-focused analysis, by contrast, is geared more toward predicting
whether a case will make it to trial at all, since it focuses primarily on the decisions of judges and
not the actions of juries. Jury verdict reporters therefore provide an additional outcomeprediction tool that lawyers can use to assess both the likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict and the
potential size of such a verdict in the event a case proceeds to trial.
Another source of empirical information that is more limited in terms of its accessibility is
confidential settlement data. Attorneys who work with insurance companies, for example, have
the benefit of the insurer’s collected settlement and jury-verdict data from earlier cases the
insurer has litigated to help inform their outcome predictions. In one respect, this information is
narrower than that found in jury verdict reporters, insofar as it is limited to the cases handled by
that insurer (although some insurers may elect to pool such information for their collective use).
But in other respects it is broader: for one thing, the insurers are generally going to have more
extensive information about the facts, and for another, they have information concerning
settlements, in addition to verdicts. This gives the lawyer a more comprehensive picture of
possible case outcomes, since most cases settle prior to trial.73 Jury verdict reporters, by contrast,
are unable to obtain information about most settlements, due to the confidentiality clauses
contained in most settlement agreements.74

73

See Kaster, supra note 19, at 43, n.1.
Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by the Court: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 (1999) (confidentiality agreements are frequently used to hide from public view the
terms of settlements and the underlying facts); Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of
Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 867 (2007) (“Even the most hotly contested lawsuits typically end
in a confidential settlement…”).
74
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The third source of empirical information that is used to inform outcome predictions is jury
research. Lawyers can hire jury- research firms to consult with them on cases,75 and these firms
provide lawyers empirical information in two principal ways. First, they can provide information
about jury behavior generally, based upon their own research. Second, they can empanel mock
juries that sit through practice trials and evaluate the dispute in question firsthand. This allows
the lawyers to try out different arguments and strategies and see how effective they are with the
mock jury, and it also provides them information about how an actual jury is likely to resolve the
dispute.76 The information derived from a mock jury is of a different nature from that obtained
from either jury verdict reports or from compilations of settlement data, insofar as the latter two
sources focus on actual results from past cases, whereas a mock jury verdict relies on a
hypothetical assessment of facts that are identical to the prospective case. The drawback to jury
research is that it is very expensive, and therefore it is of limited availability to practitioners in
many cases.77
The principal tools of case forecasting, then, are: (1) the traditional element-focused analysis
based on legal research, (2) the experience of seasoned lawyers, and (3) empirical information
about how similar cases have been resolved in the past, compiled from jury verdict reporters,
and, in certain cases, from compilations of settlement data and jury research information. The
following section of this article examines how effective these tools are in terms of predicting

75

See generally Robert F. Ruckman, Focusing Your Case Through Jury Research: Mock Trials and Other Tools, 46
THE BRIEF: CHICAGO 58 (Spring 2017) (describing the basic tools of jury research consultants).
76
See Jeh Charles Johnson, Mock Juries: Why Use Them?, 35 LITIGATION 32 (Winter 2009); Jerry W. Thomas,
Mock Juries, DECISION ANALYST (www.decsionanalysit.com/whitepapers). For a good summary of how mock juries
are used and how the process proceeds, see Mary A. Bedikian & Jerome D. Hill, The Ultimate Power of Persuasion:
Using the Mock Jury to Enhance Litigation Strategy, 72 MICH. B. J. 1046 (1993).
77
See generally Thomas, supra note 76, at 1. Some research information regarding jury behavior in a generic sense
is published in academic journals. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making,
244 SCIENCE 1046 (1989) (offering an example of an early research piece on jury behavior). But generic information
of this type is not as valuable for purposes of outcome prediction as case-specific information.
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likely litigation outcomes, looking with particular focus at the traditional element-focused
analysis.
III.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE TRADITIONAL TOOLS

The tools lawyers have traditionally used to predict case outcomes have a number of
limitations. As a result, outcome prediction--notwithstanding its major importance to the practice
of law--Has always been a rough science, its accuracy leaving much to be desired.78 This section
examines the limitations of the traditional tools of outcome prediction, with a particular focus on
the element-focused analysis. 79
A.

The Element-Focused Analysis

As a predictive tool, the traditional element-focused analysis lawyers use to forecast case
results has a number of shortcomings. This is primarily because its accuracy depends upon an
overly simplified view of how legal analysis works. In order to accurately predict how a
prospective case will come out using the traditional element focused analysis, the lawyer making
the prediction must be able to rely on the consistent applicability of legal rules to known facts. In
other words, it must be the case that the rules can be clearly ascertained, that the facts are known,
and that relevantly similar factual contexts can be compared so as to determine the applicability

78

See Kastor, supra note 19, at 44-45 (discussing research on the degree to which attorneys value cases incorrectly,
and assessing reasons for the shortcoming); Goodman-Delanhanty, et al., supra note 27, at 133.
79
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the traditional tools, clients continue to pay handsomely for lawyerly advice,
indicating at least a market belief that lawyers’ prognosticative skills have value. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal
Realism, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 267, 312 (1997). But then again, people pay good money for tarot-card and palm
readings as well, which probably says more about many people’s strong desire to know the future, than about the
actual success of traditional case forecasting. In theory, the accuracy of lawyer outcome predictions could be tested.
In fact, a recent study is enlightening as to the accuracy of the traditional tools. See Daniel Martin Katz, et al,
Predicting the Behavior of the Supreme Court of the United States: A General Approach, arXiv:1407.6333v1
[physics.soc.ph] (July 27, 2014) (describing a forecasting model that correctly predicts with approximately 70%
accuracy the outcomes of Supreme Court decisions, which is approximately the same success rate as expert Supreme
Court watchers.) Presumably, a similar study could be undertaken of trial court outcomes, using focus groups to test
the accuracy of lawyers’ predictions. But currently no such data are publicly available.
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of the rules. And it must be the case that the rules will be consistently applied in future cases, in
the same way they were in past cases.80
There are several inherent problems with this approach, however, that hinder its
reliability as a predictive tool. These include: (1) uncertainty as to the precise facts that should be
applied to the analysis; (2) uncertainty as to the precise scope of the legal rules that should be
applied to the analysis; (3) the difficulty in assessing the legal significance of certain facts; (4)
the difficulty in accounting for non-doctrinal considerations that may affect the outcome of the
case; (5) limitations in the types of information that can be derived from published opinions; and
(6) the difficulty in making probability assessments in any precise way using the elementfocused analysis. Most of these problems have been widely recognized--though not necessarily
in the context of outcome prediction. The final factor, however, has not received significant
attention in the scholarly literature and merits a more detailed examination. The remainder of this
section discusses each factor in turn.
1. Factual Uncertainty
The first problem with the traditional element-focused analysis is that it relies on accurate
factual comparisons between the merits prospective case and case precedents,81 and yet there is
frequently uncertainty as to the facts in a prospective (or even ongoing) case.82 This is
particularly a problem at the beginning of a case, when the element-focused analysis is often
used to assess the viability of a particular cause of action. At this stage of the proceeding, the
lawyer must rely primarily upon the factual account provided by the client, together with any

80

Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 16, at 1342; Smith, supra note 34, at 15-16.
Smith, supra note 34, at 13-16.
82
JEROME FRANK, LAW & THE MODERN MIND xii, xix (1970).
81
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additional information the lawyer can glean from any documents provided by the client, and any
independent initial fact investigation the lawyer undertakes.83
The problem with relying on the client’s account alone, of course, is that the client’s
account may be biased; thus, the facts that ultimately emerge at trial may not be in keeping with
the story that the client reported to the lawyer during the initial client interview. 84 Furthermore,
the lawyer’s subsequent factual investigation, along with the discovery process, may reveal
surprises. Unanticipated documents may turn up, and witnesses may provide somewhat different
accounts of the facts than the lawyer may have anticipated at the beginning of the case. And the
trial itself is often unpredictable. Witness credibility and likeability are important factors in the
jury’s assessment of the facts,85 and it is difficult to work this information into an elementfocused analysis, even if credibility can be accurately assessed pre-trial. Also, the trier of fact
may not weigh the evidence the way the lawyer initially thought they would, and the judge may
exclude or limit the use of certain evidence at trial that the lawyer was intending to rely on to
build the case.86
Therefore, the difficulty of knowing in advance just how the finder of fact will weave the
evidence into a particular narrative makes the application of the legal rules to the facts more
difficult for the traditional element-focused analysis than might be apparent at first blush.
2. Legal Uncertainty
This difficulty is frequently compounded by uncertainty as to the legal rules. The
traditional element-focused analysis used to assist predictions depends upon the ability of the
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Mauet, supra note 11, at 89-90.
See MICHAEL E. TIGER, NINE PRINCIPLES OF LITIGATION AND LIFE 240 (ABA 2009) (“The client may not level
with you about the documents. The client may shade the truth.”).
85
Mauet, supra note 11, at 405-406.
86
See Smith, supra note 34, at 23 (“the court may not draw the same inferences from the historical facts as you, your
client, a witness, or the opposing party did.”).
84
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lawyer to ascertain the controlling legal rules and apply them to the facts of the prospective
case.87 Yet it is often unclear what exactly the parameters of the rules are and how exactly they
apply to the prospective case.
For one thing, it is often difficult to synthesize a cogent legal rule from disparate cases.88
The intellectual exercise of distilling a rule out of multiple cases that promulgate somewhat
different and nuanced rules is not a determinative endeavor; rather, it is often possible to connect
the dots in more than one way (that is, to formulate a synthesizing rule in different ways), and it
is not always apparent in advance how a court will do so.89
Furthermore, the legal rules themselves can be vague or ambiguous. Hart’s well-known
hypothetical about a statute prohibiting “vehicles” in a park is a classic example of a vague
textual rule; as Hart argued, it is not at all obvious from the mere meanings of the words whether
a bicycle (or say a bicycle with a supplemental electric engine) is a “vehicle.”90 Thus, there is
often uncertainty as to how a court will construe the “penumbra” around the core of a rule.91
Furthermore, legal rules that are derived from cases rather than textual sources can be even more
vague and indeterminate.92 Such rules are generally highly dependent upon the particular factual
context in which they arise and are subject to refinement and modification if the facts in
subsequent cases are significantly different.93
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See generally Id. at 10-23. See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHIC. L. REV.
1175, 1179 (1989) (discussing the link between clear legal rules and predictability).
88
Neumann, supra note 33, at 18-19. For a classic legal-realist formulation of this argument, see Frank, supra note
82, at 159-171 (arguing that precedents are inherently indeterminate in terms of possible rule syntheses).
89
Frank, supra note 82, at 163 (“Every lawyer of experience comes to know (more or less unconsciously) that in the
great majority of cases, the cases are none too good as bases of prediction.”).
90
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-616 (1958).
91
Id. at 607. See also Dernbach, supra note 46, at 44.
92
This makes it easier for advocates, who can employ some creativity in formulating the applicable rule, but it
makes formulating a rule more challenging for outcome prediction, since the lawyer essentially has to make a
prediction as to how the reviewing court will formulate the rule. See Neumann, supra note 33, at 5-96, 104.
93
Id. at 73-74 (discussing how there are sometimes gaps in the law due to a lack of sufficient precedents on point).
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To be sure, comparisons of the facts of precedents to the facts of the prospective case can
often shed light on vague terms. For example, one can compare and contrast cases that have
granted summary judgment to the defendant in IIED cases based upon the severity of the
emotional distress. If a certain level of emotional distress was deemed not to be severe enough to
satisfy the severity element in a particular precedent, then the lawyer can conclude that a similar
or lesser level of emotional distress will not suffice in a prospective case. But the precedents may
still leave significant room for doubt. Because the number of precedents is frequently quite
limited, there is often a significant gray area remaining into which the facts of the prospective
case may fall. Legal rules as articulated by the courts are thus by their nature open-ended with
respect to their potential applicability, and there frequently is not enough precedent to provide
meaningful guidance as to how they will be applied in new circumstances. 94
Finally, legal rules are not entirely static, and the governing decisional law interpreting a
rule may evolve during the course of the case. What looked like a solid case at the beginning of a
litigation matter may look less certain if an ensuing legal precedent reshapes the governing rule,
and this too can affect outcome prediction.
For these reasons, therefore, determining exactly what “the law” is that should be applied
to a given factual scenario is often less straightforward than it might at first blush seem, further
limiting the effectiveness of the element-focused analysis as a predictive tool.
3. The Difficulty in Assessing the Legal Significance of Certain Facts
A related difficulty arises from the challenge of trying to ascertain from reported court
opinions exactly which facts are legally significant to a particular holding. This too adds an

Id. at 19 (“once a rule has been formulated, situations will inevitably crop up that the rulemaking or did not
anticipate her could not have been expected to contemplate.”); see also Schauer, supra note 38, at 576-579 (arguing
that the ability of precedents to constrain future decision-making depends upon the ability of the decision-maker to
determine that the legally relevant facts are similar).
94
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element of uncertainty to the element-focused analysis because it means that determining which
potential precedents are really on point can sometimes be difficult.95
Consider, as an example, the development of the tort of IIED in Florida case law. In the
Slocum case, which was the first appellate case to consider whether such a tort existed in Florida,
the Florida Supreme Court held that the tort, even if valid in Florida, would not apply to the
factual context in which the defendant caused the emotional distress to the plaintiff merely by
stating “you stink to me.”96 In the next case to consider the tort, however, Korbin v. Berlin, the
Florida Court of Appeals found that a cause of action was stated where the defendant told a sixyear-old girl things like: “do you know that your mother took a man away from his wife”; “do
you know that God is going to punish them”; and “do you know that a man is sleeping in your
mother’s room.”97 In Korbin, the court held that a cause of action was stated because a
reasonable jury could find that these statements were calculated to cause the child severe
emotional distress. “The alleged statements,” the court concluded, “and the manner and
circumstances under which they were communicated to the child leave little room to doubt that
they were made with a purpose and intent to shame her into shock the sensibility of this child of
tender years. Relating, as they did, to the child’s mother, the content and import of the statements
[were sufficient to state a cause of action].”98
From the Court of Appeals’ holding, it is apparent that the age of the defendant (young
Ms. Korbin was just six years old) was a legally significant factor to be taken account of in
future cases. In other words, a lawyer interpreting Korbin would reasonably know from the
language of the court opinion that the bar for IIED is going to be somewhat lower for outrageous
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See Schauer, supra note 38, at 577-588 (discussing the factors that determine which facts are legally relevant).
Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc., 100 So. 2d 396, 398 (1959)
97
177 So. 2d 551 (1965).
98
Id at 553.
96
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verbal statements involving children that it would be for adults. What is less clear, however, is
what exactly the court means when it refers to the “content and import” of the statements as
being a decisive factor. For example, should a lawyer comparing a future case to Korbin on its
facts also take into account the fact that the defendant in Korbin alleged sexual impropriety on
the part of the child’s mother? Or is that fact immaterial? Would the holding in the Slocum case
perhaps have been different if, instead of telling the defendant “you stink to me,” the defendant
had impugned the plaintiff’s virtue, as in Korbin? A reasonable argument could be made (by
analogy to defamation law, for example,) that sexual accusations are more likely to be actionable
than accusations of body odor. But it is not apparent from the court’s holding in Korbin that this
is so, and thus it is not apparent that the sexual nature of the statements is a legally significant
fact that could be applied to a new set of facts.99 In other words, the judicial opinion may not
reveal all of the factual considerations the judge actually relied upon in reaching the decision.100
Thus, in addition to problems of factual and legal uncertainty, the element-focused
analysis is hindered by the challenge in certain cases of determining precisely which facts have
legal significance to a particular holding.
4. The Difficulty in Assessing the Significance of Non-Doctrinal Considerations
A further uncertainty in the traditional element-focused analysis stems from its difficulty
in accounting for certain non-doctrinal considerations that may affect an outcome prediction.
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See generally Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. CHIC. L. REV. 919, 920 (2006) (describing how
judges’ reliance on simplifying heuristics leads decision-makers to focus on facts that come readily to mind at the
expense of less apparent but equally important background factors).
100
See Kevin D. Ashley & Stephanie Bruninghaus, Computer Models for Legal Prediction, 46 JURIMETRICS 309,
315-316 (2006 ) (“judges may not have disclosed the factors that influenced their decisions, or stated their rationales
accurately or completely.”); see also Llewelyn, supra note 3, at 35 (arguing that insofar as “facts or factors not
shown in the [judge’s] report are at work…the opinion gives us a misleading picture of what happened, and
therefore, misleading basis for prophecy of what will happen in the future.”).
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First, there are economic and psychological factors that can skew the analysis by leading
lawyers to take an overly optimistic view of the client’s case.101 Most obviously, there is often a
economic incentive to favor the client’s position. Obviously, a plaintiff’s lawyer will make no
of the action (and the lawyer’s own abilities) through rose-colored glasses.102 This is particularly
problematic in cases where the potential plaintiff will be paying an hourly fee; but even in more
traditional contingent-fee cases, it can still play a role. Similarly, defense lawyers paid on an
hourly basis have an obvious economic incentive to prolong a litigation matter, even if an early
settlement might be in the client’s interests.
In addition, there are several other factors that can cause cognitive biases that skew the
forecast.103 (For example, clients tend not to favor lawyers who are pessimistic or perceived to be
overly sympathetic to the opponent’s position.104) Taken together, these factors create a tendency
to unrealistically assess the client’s prospects,105 which can lead lawyers to reject as
unreasonable settlement offers that may in fact be reasonable. Theoretically, these psychological
considerations could be taken into account in tempering the conclusions of an element-focused
analysis. However, they are difficult to tease out, and nearly impossible to quantify.
The traditional element-focused analysis also fails to account for certain non-doctrinal
considerations that may influence the decision-maker(s) (i.e., the court or the jury), and thereby

This is sometimes called “optimism bias.” See Katz, supra note 10, at 929; Kaster, supra note 19, at 45.; Orin Bar
Gill, The Origin and Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22 OXFORD J. L. ECON. & ORG. 490, 491 (2006).
102
See Green & Bornstein, supra note 12, at 31 (arguing that lawyers may express heightened confidence in their
abilities in order to attract and maintain a clientele).
103
See generally Charles J. Snyder, Moneyball Lawyering, 65 ARK. L. REV. 837, 841-854 (2012) (discussing the
various cognitive factors); Davis, supra note 47, at 495-498 (discussing different cognitive biases that affect case
evaluations).
104
Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 16, at 1247, n. 23 (discussing research indicating that lawyerly overconfidence
may be a necessary trait to attract and retain clients); Kaster, supra note 19, at 45 (“If the client communicates the
expectation of hearing only positive views, and the ability to go elsewhere if unsatisfied, client think is even more
likely.”).
105
See Lowenstein, et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 135
(1993); Goodman-Delahanty, et al., supra note 27, at 139-143 (discussing research showing that lawyers are overly
optimistic in predicting trial outcomes).
101
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affect the outcome of the case. These include the types of considerations that legal realists
discussed at length a number of years ago, such as the personal biases of the judge or jury.106
Judges and juries are not machines, and they cannot be counted on to apply legal rules to the
facts in a purely mechanical manner.107 Accordingly, the traditional-element analysis is hindered
by its inability to accurately account for factors such as the likability and credibility of the parties
that can affect the outcome.108 It also neglects factors such as the reputation and success rate of
the attorneys, the historical tendencies of the individual judge(s) assigned to the case, differences
in the predilections of different courts (e.g., in different localities), etc.109 Again, this is not an
intractable problem for the traditional element-focused analysis, since the traditional analysis can
be balanced against and adjusted for these non-doctrinal factors. But it is very difficult to weight
such factors, and this makes it this is difficult to factor them into the traditional element-focused
analysis.
5. Limitations on the Amount and Type of Information Available from Published
Opinions
In addition to the issues discussed above, there is an inherent limitation on the usefulness
of the element-focused analysis due to the nature of its source material: i.e., published judicial
opinions. Since these opinions (particularly those responding to pre-trial motions) focus their
attention primarily on the proper interpretations of the law, rather than factual applications and
determinations of damages, their usefulness is primarily confined to determining whether a cause

See, e.g., Frank, supra note 82, at xii-xiii (discussing the “hidden, unconscious biases of trial judges or juries”
that affect case outcomes.) For a contemporary formulation of this view, see Posner, supra note 62, at 10 (discussing
various personal attributes that affect judicial decision-making).
107
Posner, supra note 62, at 8 (“Empirical scholars have found that many judicial decisions, by no means limited to
the Supreme Court, are strongly influenced by a judge’s political preferences, or by other extralegal factors…”).
108
See Mauet, supra note 11, at 405-406.
109
See Leiter, supra note 79, at 312 (arguing that lawyers use informal psychological, political, and cultural
knowledge to help predict judicial outcomes). See also the discussion in Part IV of this article regarding Prof.
Schauer’s discussion of outcome prediction based on non-doctrinal factors (see infra notes 187-193 and
accompanying text).
106
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of action may exist, rather than whether the plaintiff may succeed at trial and the amount of
potential recovery. In the IIED example discussed above, for instance, most of the published
opinions address motions for summary judgment or to dismiss, and they are concerned with
whether the plaintiff properly states a cause of action for IIED. One seminal Florida Supreme
Court case, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. McCarson,110 addresses an appeal from a
jury verdict. But even that opinion is primarily concerned with whether IIED is a recognized tort
in the state of Florida, and whether the plaintiff properly states a cause of action for that tort.111
Thus, it provides only limited guidance as to what an IIED plaintiff can expect to happen if the
case proceeds to trial.
The upshot is that the element-focused analysis is primarily useful as a tool for predicting
whether the plaintiff’s claim will survive the pretrial motion stage of the litigation and be
allowed to proceed to trial. Lawyers have to look to other predictive tools, e.g., jury verdict
reporters and settlement data, to formulate outcome predictions as to their clients’ chances of
success at trial, and the amount of any potential recovery.
6. The Difficulty in Making Probability Assessments in an Element-Focused
Analysis
Finally, there is one other problem that is intrinsic to the element-focused analysis that
has not received significant attention in the scholarly literature. That is the difficulty of assigning
probabilities to the applicability of the individual elements in the traditional element-focused
analysis, and the difficulty in making an overall probability assessment based upon these
individual assessments.

110
111

467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985).
Id. at 278-279.
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As to the first issue, one of the primary tenents of the element-focused analysis is that
outcome prediction is facilitated by breaking down a cause of action or defense into its
constituent elements. In other words, the traditional analysis assumes that the viability of the
cause of action or defense as a whole can best be determined by assessing the viability of each
individual element. The viability of each individual element can in turn be assessed by looking at
various IIED precedents discussing that element. And an overall assessment of the cause of
action or defense will then flow from these individual assessments.112 For example, a lawyer
examining all the Florida precedents on the severity element of IIED and applying them to a new
factual scenario tries to determine the likelihood that the court or jury in the present case would
find that the severity element was satisfied. Then, after doing the same with respect to each of
the other three IIED elements, the lawyer will be in a good position to judge whether the cause of
action as a whole will succeed. And so the more contingent elements the plaintiff has to prove,
the lower the likelihood, other things being equal, that the defendant will prevail.113
For the reasons discussed in the preceding subsections, however, determining whether an
element is satisfied is often not something that can be ascertained with any reasonable degree of
certainty. For example, as discussed above, merely by looking at the various IIED precedents in
which the severity element was found to be applicable or not, the lawyer cannot always assess
the likelihood that the trier of fact will find the severity element to be met in the prospective
case. Determining the likelihood that a particular court or jury will find a particular element to be
met is far from a precise science.114
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See Mauet, supra note 11, at 5-7.
See David A. Moran, Jury Uncertainty, Elemental Independence and the Conjunction Paradox: A Response to
Allen and Jehl, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 945, 950 (2003).
114
See Goodman-Dalahanty, et al., supra note 127, at 149-150.
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But even assuming that lawyers can make reasonably accurate probability assessments
with respect to the individual elements in a cause of action or defense, there remains a further
obstacle: determining the likelihood that the cause of action or defense as a whole is likely to
succeed, based upon the likelihood that the finder of fact will determine that each individual
element is met. And that task raises some difficult theoretical issues that seem, practically
speaking, to be intractable.
To see why, consider again the IIED example discussed above. To establish a cause of
action for IIED, a plaintiff must convince the finder of fact that each of the four required
elements is met: (1) the action was intentional; (2) the action caused emotional distress; (3) the
emotional distress was severe; and (4) the action giving rise to the distress was “outrageous”, as
that term has come to be defined through decisional law.115 If the defendant succeeds in
convincing the finder of fact that any one of these elements is not met, then the defendant
prevails. Now assume that the plaintiff’s lawyer believes that there is an 80% likelihood of
persuading the finder of fact with respect to each of the four elements. Is it likely that the action
as a whole will succeed? And if so, what is the probability?
At first blush, it may seem that the answer to the first question is clearly “yes,” even if the
answer to the second question is not obvious. But in fact, even the answer to the first question is
complicated. To assess the likelihood that the cause of action for IIED will succeed, the starting
point in a probability analysis would be to consider each separate element as an independent
variable, just as one would with a series of coin tosses. For example, the probability of getting
four “heads” in a row flipping a coin is only 1/16, even though the probability of getting “heads”
with respect to each individual toss is 1/2. In other words, the basic rule in determining the

115

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46.
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probability that a series of (independent) events will occur is determined by multiplying the odds
that each individual event will occur.116 Accordingly, in the IIED example given above, the
starting point for determining the probability that the action as a whole will succeed is
determined by multiplying the likelihood that each individual element will be satisfied. And so,
on this calculation, the probability that the trier of fact will find all four elements to be met is .8 x
.8 x .8 x .8 = .41 = 41%, which means that the plaintiff is actually more likely to lose rather than
win.
It is tempting to conclude from this that there is a tendency for plaintiffs’ lawyers to make
overly optimistic outcome predictions, since what at first blush looked intuitively likely--that the
cause of action as a whole would probably succeed--is in fact unlikely.117 However, even that
conclusion is questionable because it is based upon an assumption, as noted above, that the
individual variables (i.e., the elements of the tort) are independent of each other, when often
there is probably some degree of interdependence between them, due to the holistic nature of
judicial decision-making.118 (In other words, the factors that influence the court’s resolution of
one element may well affect its assessment of the other elements too.) 119 But multiplying the
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See generally IAN HACKING, PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC 41-43 (2001).
This is related to an evidentiary quandary that has sometimes been referred to as the “conjunction problem” or
the “conjunction fallacy.” See Paul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723 (2001).
118
See Moran, supra note 113, at 946. Furthermore, there is a counter-veiling factor at work when a plaintiff brings
multiple claims for recovery. The plaintiff in a civil matter can (and often does), allege more than one cause of
action in a lawsuit. See generally Mauet, supra note 11, at 61-64 (discussing the pros and cons of asserting multiple
claims). Suppose, for example, that the IIED claim is one of only three causes of action the plaintiff has alleged in
an action. And suppose that each cause of action is determined to have a 41% chance of success. Then the odds that
the plaintiff will fail on each count is accordingly 59% (1-.41), and thus the odds that plaintiff will fail on all three
counts is, per the multiplication rule discussed above, .59 x .59 x .59, which comes out to a probability of .205, or
20.5%. See Hacking, supra note 116, at 40 (discussing the multiplication rule of probability). And so the odds that
the plaintiff will succeed on at least one of its three causes of action alleged is accordingly .795, or 79.5% (1-.205).
Id. Therefore, even though plaintiff is likely to fail on each of the three causes of action considered independently, it
follows from the multiplication rule of probability that the plaintiff is quite likely (almost 80%) to succeed on at
least one of the plaintiff’s causes of action. (Again, however, this calculation assumes the independence of each
individual cause of action, which is probably not accurate for the same reason the individual elements are often not
independent.)
119
See Moran, supra note 113, at 946.
117
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individual probabilities of the variables in a series to determine the probability that the series as a
whole will occur is appropriate only where the variables are independent, i.e., where the
resolution of each variable has no effect of the resolution of the other variables.120 For example,
the probability of getting four “heads” in a row in a series of coin tosses is determined by
multiplying the odds of each individual coin toss (1/2 or 50%) because no one coin toss affects
any other coin toss.121 However, where one event may affect the likelihood that another will
occur, simple multiplication of the individual probabilities will not prove accurate, and a more
complicated calculation is necessary.122
Suppose, for example, that two evenly matched teams are in a World Series. Prior to the
first game, statisticians would reasonably assign a 50% likelihood that a given team would win
with respect to each individual game (disregarding for the moment things like home-field
advantage that would tend to tilt the likelihood of winning in favor of the home team). But if
team A wins the first three games, it is reasonable to assume that the odds of team A winning the
fourth game will be deemed higher than 50%, in order to take into account factors such as
momentum and demoralization of the opponent. But how much higher? The answer to that
question cannot be determined purely mathematically, though empirical data about how prior
teams performed when down 3-0 in a World Series can shed some light on it.
Bringing this back to the traditional element-focused analysis, there is reason to believe
that the individual variables in the element focused analysis (i.e., the likelihood that the trier of
fact will find each element to be satisfied) are similarly interdependent. In other words, the trier
of facts’ resolution of one element may well affect the resolution of one or more other
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Hacking, supra note 116, at 42.
JOHN W. FOREMAN, DATA SMART: USING DATA SCIENCE TO TRANSFORM INFORMATION INTO INSIGHT 81 (2014).
122
Id. at 80-82 (discussing conditional probabilities and Bayes’ Rule).
121
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elements.123 As discussed above in Part II, there is reason to think that experienced lawyers tend
to analyze cases in a more holistic way, rather than merely parsing the likelihood that each
element of the cause of action will be satisfied.124 So too there is evidence that judges and juries
decide cases a more holistic way, and that they balance a more intuitive view as to which party
should prevail in a case with a strict analysis of the separate elements.125 If so, then the trier of
fact’s resolution of one element would tend to affect the trier of fact’s assessment of the other
elements. And this interdependence would have to be factored into the outcome prediction, just
as it would in the World Series example discussed above.
However, whereas statisticians can in that example determine (with some modicum of
accuracy) the degree of interdependence of the variables by looking at past World Series
results,126 no such general data is currently available with respect to judicial decision-making.
And thus it will not be possible, practically speaking, for a lawyer to assess with accuracy the
likelihood that a cause of action will succeed, even if it were possible to assign probabilities to
each individual element. For while it can safely be assumed that the odds of success are higher
than merely multiplying out the individual probabilities of the elements would lead us to believe
(due to the likely interdependence of the elements),127 there is no publicly available information
as to how much higher. And thus one of the fundamental axioms of the element-focused analysis
is inherently flawed.
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See Moran, supra note 113, at 950-952.
See Girgerenzer & Brighton, supra note 61, at 172.
125
Posner, supra note 62, at 107-109. See also supra notes 64, 65 and accompanying text.
126
For example, statistical records may show that historically only one team in twenty-five (4%) that was been down
three games to none has ever won a World Series, whereas the odds that an evenly matched team would win four
straight is normally 6.3% (1/2 x 1/2 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 1/16=.0625), which would provide some evidence of the
momentum effect. (The sample set is so small, however, that one could not rely with any degree of confidence on
the empirical data. If, for example, a team overcame a 3-0 deficit the following year and won the world-series, the
odds would change significantly based on the then-cumulative data--from 1/25, or 4%, to 2/26, or 7.6%--leading to
the opposite conclusion.)
127
See Moran, supra note 113, at 950-952.
124
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B.

Limitations on the Other Traditional Tools of Outcome Prediction

The previous section discussed a variety of problems afflicting the traditional elementfocused analysis that lawyers use to make outcome predictions. Fortunately, this is not the only
predictive tool available to lawyers. Rather, as discussed above in Part II, lawyers, particularly
seasoned lawyers, also rely heavily on experience--their own and that of other lawyers--in
assessing potential outcomes, and they also have available to them certain empirical resources,
such as jury verdict reporters, jury research, and, in some cases, settlement data. But while these
additional tools provide useful supplements to the traditional element focused analysis, they are
not without their own significant limitations.
1. Lawyerly Experience
The first supplemental tool available to lawyers in making outcome predictions is
lawyerly experience, their own, as well as that of other lawyers they consult. For seasoned
lawyers in particular, personal experience is a very valuable tool, just as it is for seasoned
physicians in making diagnoses and in predicting the course of various diseases. As discussed
above in Section II(B), experience enables a lawyer to broaden the scope of the analysis,
bringing in non-doctrinal considerations such as the lawyer’s knowledge of a particular judge’s
propensities, or the tendencies of juries in particular localities to favor plaintiffs or defendants in
certain types of cases.128 Furthermore, experience enables lawyers to take a more holistic
approach to outcome prediction, evaluating the big picture by relying on intuitions about likely
outcomes that are honed from past cases.129
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See supra notes 101-109 and accompanying text.
See Gigerenzer & Brighton, supra note 61, at 72. For a discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of this
reliance on lawyerly intuition, see K. Davis, supra note 47, at 494-499.
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But while experience is undoubtedly a valuable tool in the lawyer’s arsenal, it is certainly
not without its limitations.130 For one thing, experience is obviously developed over time, so
more junior lawyers will be quite limited in this respect. But even for more seasoned lawyers,
information derived from experience tends to be impressionistic, since it relies upon the accuracy
of the lawyer’s memory, and because it is a filtered interpretation of past events that may be
influenced by the lawyer’s own beliefs and biases about the law, and about people and
institutions.131 Additionally, personal experience is, by its nature, limited. 132 Even in fields such
as securities trading, while a broker’s experience with how other clients have fared with respect
to certain types of investments is certainly valuable, it is not a substitute for actual experimental
data on stock performance that transcends the broker’s personal experience.133 And in law,
personal experience is even more limited because lawyers have less to go on, given the relatively
few clients most of them have as compared to, say, stock brokers and physicians.
Furthermore, lawyerly experience as a predictive tool is subject to several of the same
problems that afflict the element-focused analysis. Experience does not provide an end-around to
the challenges of factual uncertainty and legal uncertainty. Lawyers are still reliant on limited
sources of information, such as the client’s account of facts, when initially assessing a case.134
Likewise, the lawyer’s past cases will never be entirely on par factually with a prospective

In fact, one study indicates that lawyers’ accuracy in predicting outcomes is not significantly enhanced by
experience. See Goodman-Delahanty, et al., supra note 27, at 133.
131
Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 16, at 1340, note 12 (citing research indicating that lawyers “operate with
beliefs and biases that can cloud judgment.”) See also Kester, supra note 19, at 44-45 (discussing the factors that can
cloud a lawyer’s judgment); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 897-901 (2006)
(discussing distortions that arise in judicial decision-making due to judges’ reliance on simplifying heuristics that are
based in part on cognitive biases).
132
See Charles J. Snyder, supra note 26, at 849.
133
As a result, medical advice is heavily dependent on experimental data. This is true in a number of other fields as
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data-driven decision-making in the stock-brokerage industry).
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matter, so how a court will apply a vague legal rule to a new legal situation remains subject to
doubt.135 And the lawyer will not easily be able to get around the problem of identifying exactly
which facts are legally significant, since a lawyer generally has only limited information about
what facts really influenced the court or jury’s decision.136
Thus, while experience is certainly a helpful guide to the lawyer, it is not by itself a
particularly accurate source of outcome prediction in individual cases.
2. Empirical Information
The other principal predictive tool discussed in Part II was empirical information
available to the lawyer, in particular, jury verdict reporters, jury research, and, in certain cases,
settlement data. While these too are helpful tools, they too have some significant limitations.
With respect to jury verdict reporters, they are limited in terms of the types of
information they provide (and also, to some extent, in terms of their reliability, given that some
of the information comes from the lawyers involved in the case). Often, for example, they
provide only cursory factual summaries, which exacerbates the problems created by factual
uncertainty and legal uncertainty.137 As discussed in Part III(A) above, it is difficult to compare
cases on their facts when factual information about the prospective case is of limited reliability
(due to factual uncertainty), and the information about the precedent case is very limited in
scope.138 Furthermore, since the factual information available in jury verdict reporters is not
generally presented in a very detailed manner, the ability of lawyers to draw generalizations
about specific jury findings is limited.
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As discussed in Part II(C) above, some lawyers are able to draw upon case-specific jury
research tools to supplement jury verdict reporters.139 These have the advantage of providing
very detailed and case-specific information about a prospective case and its likely outcome, and
they also allow lawyers to experiment with different adversarial approaches.140 But they too are
limited insofar as they do not address whether a cause of action is likely to survive a motion to
dismiss or summary judgment; rather, they only shed light on the likely outcome in the event of
trial. (In that respect, they suffer from a limitation that is the flipside of the limitation discussed
above in Section III(A)(5) with respect to the element-focused analysis.)141 They are also onesided as to the nature of the evidence, in that they do not allow the mock jury to hear the other
side’s actual case until trial. 142 And they are limited insofar as they tend to be shorter than actual
trials, relying on truncated evidentiary presentations.143
Furthermore, as discussed in Part II, mock trials are very expensive, and thus they are
generally limited to only high-dollar cases.144 Even testing a case on a single mock jury or focus
group requires a substantial expenditure, and to ensure greater accuracy, it would be necessary to
try the prospective case to multiple mock juries, to eliminate possible idiosyncrasies of a single
panel. But the costs associated with doing that narrows the usefulness of mock juries as a
predictive tool to a very small subset of cases.
Finally, as discussed in Part II(C) above, settlement data can be used to assist lawyers in
making outcome predictions. Such data is often valuable in assessing a potential client’s
exposure or expected recovery, particularly since the great majority of cases ultimately settle
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prior to trial. To be sure, settlement data won’t provide direct information about the prospects for
a case’s surviving a dispositive motion, such as a summary judgment motion, nor will it provide
direct information about the expected outcome at trial. Still, it is a valuable predictive tool that
certain lawyers rely on heavily in assessing cases.145 Relying on past cases, for example, an
insurance defense lawyer can make a reasonably accurate assessment of the settlement value of a
case and can make appropriate settlement decisions accordingly.
The main drawback to the use of settlement data as a predictive tool (as in the case with
jury research) is that it is not readily available to most lawyers, since only certain clients, such as
insurance companies and large corporations, who face repeated litigation and are thus in a
position to acquire large quantities of useful settlement data. And since the majority of
settlements are confidential and not available to the public,146 most lawyers have no way of
tapping into this pool of information.
In sum, empirical information serves as a valuable predictive tool for lawyers. But its
value is limited insofar as much of the most useful information is unavailable to the majority of
lawyers who make outcome predictions.
IV.

USING DATA SCIENCE TO IMPROVE OUTCOME PREDICTION

Part III of this article discussed the principal reasons why lawyers struggle with outcome
prediction, using the traditional tools available to them. While those tools certainly have some
predictive value, they are also subject to significant shortcomings and limitations that hamper
their ability to provide helpful guidance to their clients concerning potential or pending legal
matters. In the past few years, however, a potentially powerful new tool has received significant
attention: the prospect of using data science to help lawyers make better outcome predictions.
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This part of the article discusses the potential for data science to provide lawyers with a powerful
new tool to improve their outcome predictions.
A. Data Science and Prediction
“Data science” and “data analytics” are fairly vague terms, encompassing a number of
different techniques analysts use to drive information from large sets of data. As one prominent
analyst defines it, “Data science is the transformation of data using mathematics and statistics
into valuable insights, decisions and products.”147 It includes traditional analytics techniques
such as optimization, forecasting, and simulation, along with more recent innovations such as
data mining, artificial intelligence clustering, machine-learning, and detection of outliers.148
The use of such tools to make predictions is often referred to as “predictive analytics” or
“outcome analysis.”149
Predictive analytics has been successfully employed in a variety of contexts. In the realm of
politics, for example, analysts such as Nate Silver have used predictive analytics with some
degree of success to anticipate election results.150 In the area of medicine, predictive analytics
has shown promise in predicting disease outbreaks, helping physicians diagnose diseases, and in
advancing genomics research.151 In the area of sports, predictive analytics has been used for
gambling purposes to predict the outcome of games and tournaments, as well as by teams to
predict (e.g., for purposes of determining how much to spend on a free-agent, or which rookie to
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Foreman, supra note 121, at xiv.
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draft) the likelihood that a player’s career will continue its current trajectory or improve.152 In the
field of meteorology, predictive analytics has been used to improve weather forecasts.153 And in
the business world, predictive analytics has been successfully used for a variety of purposes.
Most notably, it is used for marketing and advertising purposes to identify in a targeted manner
consumers who might be most likely to purchase particular products.154 But there are a host of
other business uses for predictive analytics as well,155 ranging from consumer fraud detection, to
evaluating consumer debt risks, to helping dating services find promising matches, to enabling
autonomous cars to operate, to automatically customizing music “stations” for individual
listeners,156 and so on.
The success of predictive analytics over the past decade or so is largely due to advances in
the field of artificial intelligence, which have enabled predictive analytics to make more accurate
predictions than the traditional forecasting models that were used to facilitate predictions in
earlier years. The traditional forecasting models required the researcher to specify the variables
that the researcher believed to be significant for purposes of prediction.157 In law, for example, a
lawyer may think that the court and particular judge involved, the location of the trial, the
particular lawyers representing the parties, and, of course, the nature of the cause(s) of action
involved are the most important predictive variables. The lawyer can then focus on those
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variables when comparing the facts of precedent cases to the facts of a prospective case. The
more sophisticated tools that employ artificial intelligence advance the analysis further by using
algorithms to identify their own predictive variables. 158 Thus, instead of relying just on a
researcher’s intuition as to what factors have predictive import, some artificially intelligent tools
are capable of identifying patterns and automatically isolating predictive variables that the
researcher may not have considered. They do this by automatically identifying patterns in
training sets of data, and then creating predictive models based upon these patterns.159 In
addition, some of the newer tools differ from the earlier, more basic analytics tools in that they
employ machine-learning techniques, which means that they are able to learn from their
mistakes, and thereby continue to hone over time the accuracy of their predictions.160 If a
particular variable turns out to be a less promising predictor than originally hypothesized, a
sophisticated predictive-analytics model will automatically adjust the weighting it gives that
variable going forward to improve the accuracy of the model.161
Perhaps the most high-profile example in recent years of using artificial intelligence to drive
more accurate predictions has been the development of applications based upon IBM’s Watson
platform.162 To demonstrate the capability of Watson, IBM first used it to develop an artificially
intelligent Jeopardy contestant, equipping the computer with memory capable of accessing
millions of documents very quickly, and then training it with appropriate sample sets to predict
the correct answers to Jeopardy questions.163 At first, Watson was unable to beat a group of
Jeopardy champions. However, because it had machine-learning capability, Watson was able to
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improve its performance as time went on to the point where it was able to beat these champions
regularly.164 Subsequently, IBM has used the Watson platform to enable such tools as an
artificially intelligent chess player165 and an artificially intelligent chef,166 both of which are able
to compete well with masters of their respective crafts. And predictive analytics tools are now
being used in fields as medicine as well, where, among other things, they can help predict
disease patterns and aid doctors in making diagnoses.167
As discussed in the following sections, applications based on the Watson platform are also
now being used, along with other predictive-analytics tools, to assist the practice of law.
B. Data Science in the Practice of Law
In the practice of law, data science has been assuming an increasingly important role over the
past few years. This began in the area of e-discovery, where data science has enabled law firms
and corporate legal departments to conduct discovery investigations in a significantly more cost
efficient and timely manner, using techniques such as auto classification and predictive
coding.168 But data science techniques have also been used increasingly for other practice related
purposes as well, such as: case management, billing and budgeting; records management and
other types of information governance; contracts review and management; selection of outside
counsel; and (most pertinent to this article) outcome prediction.169 In addition, legal research
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services have employed some important data-science advances to improve the responsiveness of
their searches.170
The legal profession’s demand for data analytics services appears to be growing quickly. For
the past several years, an organization called “The Coalition of Technology Resources for
Lawyers” (“CTRL”) has published an annual survey of the use of data analytics among corporate
legal departments in the United States. In the 2015-2016 survey, 93% of practitioners reported
that they thought data analytics will become more important and more widespread in the legal
profession in the coming ten years, including 31% who predicted that data analytics would be
“very important,” considered “indispensable,” and its use “widespread” within the next 10
years.171 One year later, the 2016-2017 survey revealed that 99% of practitioners now thought
that data analytics will be very important, considered indispensable, and its use widespread
within the next decade.172 According to the survey, the principal purposes for which corporate
legal departments use data analytics at the present time are for (1) e-discovery (including
document culling, early case assessment, and fact-finding), followed by (2) case management
(including management of outside counsel, comparing projected spending to actual spending,
resource allocation, and budgeting, (3) review and analysis of contracts,173 and (4) information
governance (including facilitating defensible disposition, facilitating compliance with records
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policies and other requirements, and facilitating data migration).174 Beyond these uses, some
smaller ventures have been exploring other possible uses for predictive analytics in the practice
of law, such as aiding lawyers in the jury selection process.175
Data science, therefore, will undoubtedly play an increasingly important role in the practice
of law in future years.176 And while outcome prediction is not, at the present time, at the
forefront of data science applications in the law, predictive analytics tools are being used to
enable predictions in other areas of legal practice, as noted above. In the area of criminal law, for
example, predictive analytics now offers researchers a powerful new tool to assess the potential
for recidivism among defendants as a routine part of sentencing decisions.177
The following section looks at how lawyers are likely to incorporate predictive analytics into
their arsenal of traditional predictive tools to facilitate more accurate outcome predictions, and it
discusses some challenges predictive analytics will have to overcome for it to be a true game
changer.
C. The Prospects for Using Predictive Analytics to Improve Outcome Predictions
An increasing number of legal commentators have begun to look at predictive analytics as a
potentially powerful new tool in the area of outcome prediction.178 And in fact there is good
reason to believe that predictive analytics may well drive some significant changes in the way
lawyers assess potential case outcomes in their day-to-day practices. Thus, in the not-too-distant
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future, we can expect to see lawyers relying heavily on predictive analytics to complement the
traditional tools of prediction, such as the element-focused analysis.
This section looks at the current state of predictive analytics in the legal profession, and it
assesses the potential going forward for predictive analytics to supplant, or more plausibly,
complement, the traditional tools of outcome prediction discussed above in Part II. Subsection
(1) looks at the historical development of predictive analytics as a tool for making outcome
predictions. Subsection (2) looks at the current state of predictive analytics as a tool for assessing
outcome predictions in the practice of law. And subsection (3) examines some key challenges
predictive analytics will have to overcome going forward if it is to have a significant effect on
the way lawyers make outcome predictions.
1. The Development of Predictive Analytics as a Tool for Outcome Prediction
Fundamentally, predictive analytics is an extension of the use of empirical information,
which is one of the traditional tools of outcome prediction.179 Like that traditional tool, it helps
lawyers predict case outcomes by comparing information about past cases with a prospective
case. Underlying both tools is an assumption (grounded in the concept of stare decisis) that
similar cases are likely to be decided similarly.180 But whereas the use of jury-verdict reporters
and settlement data rely on the lawyer’s subjective assessment of similarity, predictive analytics
employs computer algorithms to detect objective patterns in the language of court opinions and
other court documents that can then be compared to the prospective case.181
For more than half a century now, researchers have been exploring the potential use of such
computational analyses to predict the outcome of legal cases. Most of the early efforts were
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made in cognate fields, such as political science and artificial intelligence.182 However, in 1964,
a law professor named Stuart Nagel published an article in the Texas Law Review entitled
“Applying Correlation Analysis to Case Prediction.”183 This article expanded on an article Nagel
had written three years earlier, entitled “Using Simple Calculations to Predict Judicial
Decisions,” which was published in the journal American Behavioral Scientist.184 In these
articles, Nagel used reapportionment cases to demonstrate how “correlation analysis” can be
used to identify patterns in cases where the party attacking apportionment is successful. Nagel
then described the process for conducting this analysis as follows:
This process can be partially mechanized by converting the full text of the relevant cases
into punched tape either by a typist or an optical scanner. Which side won in each case as
well as the full text should be punched on the tape. The punch tape can then be processed
by a program computer to read out each word (including its grammatical variations and
synonyms) that has a +20 correlation or more (at a given level of probability) with
victory for a given side (e.g., the apportionment attacker). If too few or too many
predictive words are read out, the specified correlational probability levels can be raised
or lowered accordingly. The resulting list of predictive words should generate insights as
to what some of the relevant predictive variables are.185
Nagel thus set out, over 50 years ago, in in a rudimentary form, the basic strategy for using
predictive analytics to identify patterns in the language of case law that can be used to predict
case outcomes.
Over the next several decades, data scientists, political scientists and researchers in the area
of artificial intelligence worked on refining techniques for using computational analyses to
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predict case outcomes (particularly Supreme Court decisions), with limited success.186 But the
issue never really generated much interest among legal academics until personal computers
started becoming ubiquitous in the practice of law during the 1990s.
In 1998, Professor Frederick Shauer wrote an article entitled “Prediction and Particularity”187
that laid an important theoretical foundation for predictive analytics. In that article, Schauer
discusses the role of a legal doctrine in enabling outcome predictions, by contrasting the views of
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Carl Llewellyn. Under Holmes’ view, Schauer argues, a lawyer
predicts case outcomes by evaluating how courts resolved precedents by reference to traditional
legal concepts such as “contract,” “consideration,” “waiver,” etc. In so doing, the lawyer
determines precisely how courts apply these legal concepts and compares their applicability to a
prospective case in order to predict how the prospective case will likely be resolved.188
Llewellyn, on the other hand, put a greater emphasis on non-doctrinal factors in analyzing the
likely outcome of cases. As Prof. Schauer describes Llewellyn’s view:
Llewellyn did not deny that there were regularities in the law. Nor did he deny those
regularities might facilitate the process of predicting future legal outcomes. He did, however,
deny that those regularities were regularly captured by the generalizations typically referred
to as “legal doctrine,” and thus claimed that legal doctrine did not reflect empirical
regularities, and that legal regularities reflected by categorizations that did not resemble
traditional legal doctrine.189
Thus, for example, in analyzing injunctions decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals from 1920 to 1954, Holmes would look to traditional rules such as “a party who delays
claiming its rights to the detrimental reliance of another party is precluded from obtaining an
injunction” in order to predict the likely outcome of a prospective case. Llewellyn, on the other
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hand, would rely on a non-doctrinal principle such as “the coal company generally wins” to
predict the outcome of future cases.190
Prof. Schauer goes on to note that while legal scholars have largely ignored Llewellyn’s
call to focus on extralegal considerations in making outcome predictions, social scientists have
been quite active in this regard. He cites as an example a large quantity of work analyzing
Supreme Court decisions with respect to extra-legal variables that enable outcome predictions.191
Shauer concludes that while there is slim evidence for the view that traditional doctrinal analysis
enables accurate outcome predictions, “there is great empirical support for what [social
scientists] call the ‘attitudinal model,’ the view that the best predictors of Supreme Court
decisions are the policy attitudes or preferences of the justices, and that, often, the best predictors
of those are the party affiliations of the presidents who appointed them.”192 Schauer’s analysis is
important, therefore, because it emphasizes the importance, for purposes of outcome prediction,
of looking for meaningful patterns among precedents that go beyond the traditional doctrinal
concepts the courts purport to rely on in those precedents, which is a task for which predictive
analytics is well suited.193 For even if such factors are deemed to be inappropriate for some
purposes, such as legal explanations and arguments, their predictive value for purposes of
outcome prediction should not be disregarded.
2.

The Current Status of Predictive Analytics as a Tool for Outcome
Prediction
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Over the past several years, legal scholars have begun to take an increasing interest in the
topic of prediction in the law, particularly the prospects for using data science to enable more
accurate outcome predictions. Among the more prominent voices in the field at present time is
Professor Daniel Katz, whose important paper Quantitative Legal Prediction – or – How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data Stream Future Legal Services
Industry194 provides an important summary of the current uses of data analytics in the practice of
law, including outcome prediction. With respect to outcome prediction, the piece examines the
early efforts to employ machine learning to enable outcome predictions, particularly in the fields
of patent law and securities fraud class actions. Katz stresses the preliminary nature of these
efforts, and argues that predictive analytics will soon be employed widely to assist lawyers in
making outcome predictions.195 He concludes that “the age of quantitative legal predictions is
about a mixture of humans or machines working together to outperform either working in
isolation.”196
The study of predictive analytics to assess potential case outcomes has also led to the
development of products that can be used to aid outcome prediction. The principal commercial
online research services began offering tools for evaluating potential case outcomes several years
ago. These tools essentially aggregated data from jury verdict reports and related publications,
allowing users to filter results by category such as type of case, lawyer, judge, and location to
find comparable cases. Westlaw, for example, introduced a product called Case Evaluator,197
and Lexis/Nexis introduced a product called Verdict & Settlement Analyzer.198 Both provide
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information about verdicts (and some settlements) for particular causes of action in various
jurisdictions, showing averages and ranges of recovery for a variety of different types of cases.
They break the information down by jurisdiction and court, by party (plaintiff vs. defendant), by
subject matter, and by amount of verdict, and they provide case summaries, along with trial and
appellate documents that were filed in the actions. These tools have brought a greater degree of
precision to the process of comparing and analyzing past cases that are similar (per various
metrics that the user can specify) to the case in question. Instead of just perusing summaries of
cases in jury verdict reporters and looking for similarities to the case in question, the lawyer can
rely on data automatically compiled from such cases by the search engine.199
In addition, somewhat more sophisticated tools that incorporate artificial intelligence and
machine-learning techniques have been introduced in recent years by smaller commercial
ventures (mostly incubated by universities) to assist lawyers in evaluating cases. The pioneer in
this area of predictive analytics has been a company called Lex Machina, which is now owned by
LexisNexis.200 Based in Silicon Valley, Lex Machina began as a public interest project at
Stanford University, and was a spin-off from the law school and the Computer Science
Department.201 The company has mainly focused on two areas of law: patent litigation (its
original focus) and securities litigation, though it now provides some analytic services with
respect to other types of cases as well, including antitrust cases. The company uses predictive
analytics tools to provide insights on opposing lawyers, law firms, parties, judges, venues, and
other information, and it offers individualized early case assessment.202 On the patent litigation
side, it has compiled a huge database of information from the Electronic Document Information
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System of the United States International Trade Commission, as well as from the United States
Patent and Trademark Office, including documents from trials before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board. It then supplements this information with trial-court documents from the federal
government’s PACER service.203 On the securities side, the company analyzes data regarding
damages from reports of SEC penalties, discouragements, and approved settlements.204
With respect to outcome prediction, Lex Machina’s Case Resolution Analytics tool tracks
different variables and case outcomes to enable more accurate predictions. Other tools provide
information on trends in holdings among judges and courts, evaluations of opposing counsel
parties, information on a party’s litigation history, and damages analytics. A fairly new product
is the company’s Motion Kickstarter tool, which assists lawyers in drafting motions by
identifying which arguments and motion styles are likely to be the most successful in a certain
type of case, taking into account the particular court or judge.
While Lex Machina was the first significant venture to make predictive analytics available to
lawyers, it has now been joined by several other significant ventures. These include Bloomberg
Law, which introduced its Litigation Analytics tool in 2016,205 Judicial Perspectives (which is
owned by ALM),206 Premonition (which is based on IBM’s Watson platform and focuses on
lawyer selection analytics),207 and Ravel Law.208 Of these, Ravel Law appears to making the
biggest splash. Ravel Law, like Lex Machina, is a 2012 spinoff from Stanford University’s law,
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computer science, and “d.school” departments.209 And like Lex Machina, it is now owned by
Lexis and available as part of Lexis’ subscription package.210 It is best known for its innovative
legal research platform, which uses visualization tools to show users at a glance the complex
relationships between the various precedents interpreting a particular rule.211 But Ravel Law has
also moved in the past two years into the realm of predictive analytics. Its Court Analytics and
Judge Analytics tools analyze, for a particular judge or court, or by jurisdiction, case outcomes,
language patterns, and citation history to provide insight on past rulings and to shed light on
anticipated future case outcomes. 212 The tools are thus valuable both for outcome predictions, as
well for crafting persuasive arguments. In addition, Ravel Law has recently introduced a new
tool called Firm Analytics tool that tracks, for various legal specialties, the success rates and
volume of work of various large law firms in order to assist consumers of legal services in
choosing the best firm for a particular job.213
Another venture that has drawn significant attention is Ross Intelligence. Incubated at the
University of Toronto, Ross intelligence is now located in Palo Alto. The company is primarily
associated with legal research; it is based on IBM’s Watson platform and relies upon artificial
intelligence and machine learning tools. 214 Ross Intelligence touts its product as the “world’s
first digital lawyer” because it allows lawyers using it to ask natural language questions, to which
it provides answers by predicting the most applicable solution to the problem posed by the
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question.215 Thus, while the product is not currently a tool for making outcome predictions (since
is not equipped to handle questions such as “what is the likelihood that my client wins this case,
given the following facts”), it does not seem far-fetched to think that the product could
eventually be enabled to make such predictions.216
In sum, while the available predictive-analytics technology is not yet at a state where it can
enable accurate outcome predictions over a broad variety of case types, the landscape is evolving
quickly, and it would seem reasonable, based upon the trajectory of growth in the field, to
envision that these tools will be widely used by practitioners to supplement the traditional tools
of outcome prediction in the not-too-distant future. For this vision to be realized, however, data
scientists will need to overcome the obstacles discussed in subsection (3) below.
3.

Potential Limitations on the Use of Predictive Analytics as a Tool
for Outcome Prediction

While the future of predictive analytics in the legal profession looks bright, it is important to
keep in mind some of the potential limitations on its ability to improve outcome predictions.
While the technological advances hold significant potential, it is easy to get caught up in the
enthusiasm and lose track of their limitations. As Nate Silver emphasizes in his book on
predictive analytics, The Signal and the Noise--Why So Many Predictions Fail, But Some Don’t:
“[I]f science and technology at the heroes of this book, there is risk in the age of Big Data about
becoming too starry-eyed about what they might accomplish.”217 So while predictive analytics
has some advantages over the traditional tools of outcome prediction, particularly the elementfocused analysis discussed in Parts II and III, it is premature to say that it will replace these
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traditional tools in the near future; rather, predictive analytics can be expected to complement the
traditional tools of outcome prediction.
On the plus side, predictive analytics is not subject to some of the problems with the
traditional tools discussed in Part III above. The difficulty in assessing probabilities that afflicts
the element-focused analysis, for example, is not an issue because predictive analytics does not
rely on an analysis of independent variables,218 relying instead on the detection of subtle
correlations to enable predictions. Likewise, predictive analytics is better able to account for
extra-legal considerations than the traditional tools because it can look for patterns among the
holdings of individual judges, courts, and party types, based on factors the courts may not have
enunciated in the opinions (e.g., it can quantify the percentage of time the coal company actually
does win in injunction cases).219 And the data set on which the analysis is based could be
significantly broader than the limited collection of precedents a lawyer uses in an elementfocused analysis, since predictive analytics could take into account trial documents and other
information about a case beyond mere published opinions.220 Nevertheless, as discussed further
below, the availability of meaningful data is not as comprehensive as one would hope.
According to Nate Silver, a lack of meaningful data is one of the two principal factors that
limits the success of predictive analytics generally. The other is the difficulty in separating what
he calls the “noise” from the “signal.” As Silver puts it:
The goal of any predictive models is to capture as much signal as possible as little noise as
possible. Striking the right balance is not always so easy, and their ability to do so will be
dictated by the strength of the theory in the quality and quantity of data.221
218
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This difficulty in teasing out the signal from the noise is the central metaphor that runs
throughout Silvers’ book. What he seems to be referring to is the unique feature of predictive
analytics that is both a strength and a weakness. Because it does not try to tease out causal
factors for purposes of explanation, but merely looks to find predictive patterns, predictive
analytics is able to identify a broader array of meaningful (for purposes of prediction but not
necessarily explanation) correlations than traditional scientific methods.222
To use a simple example, predictive analytics may reveal that persons living in a certain
geographic area tend to be afflicted with lung cancer at a higher rate than average. But this
correlation does not show that living in the locale is itself the cause of lung cancer-- it may just
be that persons living in that locality smoke a higher rate than average. But for purposes of
prediction (e.g., for healthcare planning purposes), that distinction doesn’t really matter.
This strength, however, can also be a weakness. Because it does not deal in the realm of
causation, predictive analytics is subject to identifying accidental correlations that are not
meaningful and do not inform predictions.223 The key challenge for predictive analytics is thus to
find ways to eliminate statistical anomalies (i.e., randomness) that do not enable accurate
predictions, and in fact impede them. As Silver puts it:
It would be nice if we could just plug data into a statistical model, crunch the numbers,
and take for granted that it was a good representation of the real world. Under some
conditions, especially in a data-rich field like baseball, that assumption is fairly close to

Siegel, supra note 149, at 90 (“When applying PA, we usually don’t know about causation, and we often don’t
necessarily care…the objective is more to predict than it is to understand the world and figure out what makes it
tick.”); see also Katz, supra note 10, at 952. Of course, the use of predictive analytics is not limited to finding these
types of “black box” correlations. Predictive analytics can also be used to help lawyers craft effective arguments by
identifying legal arguments, phrases, or cases that have proven to be particularly persuasive, either in general, or
with respect to a particular judge. Ravel Law, for example, touts its Court Analytics and Judge Analytics tools for
this purpose. See www.ravellaw.com/products.
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being correct. In many other cases, a failure to think carefully about causality lead us up
blind alleys.224
Thus, predictive analytics is still a work in progress, and significant work remains to be done to
improve its ability to distinguish meaningful (i.e., predictive) patterns from non-meaningful
patterns.225
Furthermore, the use of predictive analytics to inform outcome predictions in the law also
suffers from the other significant challenge that Silver references: i.e., a lack of quality data. The
world of judicial decision-making is not the world of baseball, where “pretty much everything
that has happened on a major-league field in the past 140 years has been dutifully and accurately
recorded, and hundreds of players play in the big leagues every year.” 226 Rather, as discussed
above in PartIII)(A), there are some significant limitations on the types of information available
with respect to the actual bases for judge and jury decisions. This is perhaps particularly apparent
with respect to settlement information, where the lack of widely available data concerning
confidential settlements poses a significant challenge for lawyers using predictive analytics to
inform outcome predictions. The problem is that most litigation matters are resolved through
settlement, and most of the litigation matters that are resolved through settlement rely on
confidentiality clauses to limit public access to the terms of the settlement.227 But unless data
analytics companies can tap into such information, their predictions will not be highly accurate,
given the limited data sets that they are able to draw from with respect to case outcomes. To be
sure, there are some types of litigation where settlement data is more widely available, such as
securities class-action litigation, in which many settlements require court approval, and are
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therefore in the public domain. Thus, it is not surprising that companies like Lex Machina have
so far focused on specialty areas, such as securities litigation and intellectual property litigation.
But this is the exception, not the rule; for most litigation matters, information about settlement
amounts remains largely outside the reach of lawyers not privy to the case. 228
Of course, much of this data is out there; the challenge is to make it readily available to
lawyers for purposes of outcome prediction. Currently, insurance companies and other
corporations that are involved in frequent litigation compile settlement data for their own use,
and this gives them a significant advantage in predicting how litigation matters are likely to be
resolved. But most lawyers do not have access to this type of information, and they are thus left
to draw primarily on the traditional outcome prediction tools discussed in Parts II and III above.
If, going forward, insurers and other companies with large quantities of settlement data would
agree to pool such data and make it publicly available (perhaps for a fee), that would go a long
way toward enabling predictive analytics to provide reasonable assessments of litigation
prospects in prospective cases. But there is no indication at present to think that such companies
plan to do so.229
A further limitation on the quality of data that predictive analytics relies on is its generic
nature, which makes it difficult to track individual factual distinctions between cases. Just
evaluating the data from published opinions does not provide a lot of information about the facts
that may have weighed on a court’s decision in a precedent, beyond what the court specifically
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identifies as legally relevant.230 Without reference to the entire factual record in a case, predictive
analytics will be limited in its ability to find meaningful factual similarities between past cases
and a prospective case, thus limiting its predictive potential. To be sure, including pleadings and
other trial documents that contain factual information in the data set can help significantly in this
respect, which is presumably why a company such as Lex Machina includes trial-level
documents (such as those available on the PACER database) in its analysis.231 But even with
such trial documents, factual information is limited, since some of the documents that would be
the most data-rich, such as deposition transcripts, are generally not publicly available. This lack
of factual information is particularly acute with respect to non-doctrinal considerations that may
affect the outcome of a case. The likability and credibility of the individual parties, for example,
is widely recognized as a factor affecting the outcome of trials.232 Yet this not the kind of
information that generally gets compiled in court documents, particularly with respect to jury
trials.
In sum, the use of data analytics to predict legal outcomes is not likely to be a cure-all for
the problems associated with the traditional predictive tools. But it may well provide a useful
supplemental tool in the not-too-distant future to augment the type of predictive analysis
undertaken in the traditional legal memorandum. And as Professor Katz argues,233 predictive
analytics tools used in conjunction with the traditional predictive tools will likely outperform
either type of tool used individually.
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CONCLUSION
Outcome prediction has always been a vital part of practicing law. Clients of all types
rely on their attorneys to provide accurate assessments of the potential legal consequences the
clients face when making important decisions. And yet, notwithstanding its enormous
importance to the practice of law, outcome prediction in the law remains a very imprecise
endeavor. The three traditional tools lawyers rely on when making predictions, the elementfocused analysis, lawyerly experience, and empirical information, are all subject to significant
limitations that hinder their effectiveness as predictive tools.
Fortunately, however, recent advances in data science are enabling new predictive tools
that look to be potential game-changers. Already, these advances are bringing about significant
changes in the way lawyers practice law, and they hold significant promise for outcome
prediction as well. Thus, it seems quite likely that predictive analytics, while not a panacea that
can replace the traditional tools of outcome prediction in the foreseeable future, will increasingly
emerge as an important supplemental tool that should help to make outcome predictions more
accurate. And that is some very good news for the clients who rely on them.
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